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2One Foundation Advocacy Evaluation - Foreword
“ Daring Voices” was commissioned 
by One Foundation to document 
and share lessons learned on funding 
advocacy on social change issues – 
children’s rights, immigrant rights,  
and mental health reform - in Ireland 
over a ten year period, 2004-2013.
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Foreword 
The nine lessons drawn out by the author have relevance in an Irish, European and, 
we believe, in an international context.
 
Why did we commission this evaluation? 
One Foundation came to funding advocacy through a learning journey. Having 
funded services on these issues for a number of years, we came to a realisation that 
a foundation could fund social services for many years, but that funding advocacy 
provided the opportunity to end the problem that requires the services. While this is 
hardly a revelation, it did take a journey to arrive at the decision as a foundation to 
allocate specific funds to advocacy on the issues we cared about most – children’s 
rights, immigrant rights, and mental health reform. Our commitment to funding 
advocacy grew as time passed, to the extent that at the half way point of our limited 
life of ten years, in 2008, three of our eight goals were advocacy goals, and a total 
of €14.8 million or 19.8 % of our funds was spent on them over ten years.
As we started this journey, we found a dearth of literature from which to learn, 
especially publications based on actual experience. “Daring Voices” is our 
contribution to this gap.
 
What have we learned?  
We are now more convinced than ever that funding advocacy can offer the 
opportunity of powerful impact on either mainstream or edgy issues, and at real 
value for money. 
 
What are the challenges? 
Timeframes are inherently elastic, but the author’s focus on identifying, aiming 
for, and capturing “incremental wins” on the journey is a useful contribution to 
addressing this. While the author legitimately focuses on the need for patience, 
there can also be quick wins to be identified by the smart funder or advocate.
Attribution of success (or failure) is the ultimate challenge in funding advocacy,  
a point well developed in this report. In the end, success has many fathers. Social 
change is a team game, and collaboration (of both funders and advocates) can add 
real value, a value which can be diminished by the need for clear attribution. One 
Foundation has never sought attribution, and indeed much of our work has been 
co-funded equally with The Atlantic Philanthropies. Funder collaboration, another 
under-researched topic, is addressed more fully in “When Aims and Objectives 
Rhyme: How Two of Ireland’s Largest Foundations Found Common Ground and 
Built a Shared Portfolio of Nearly €60 Million Without Compromising the Features 
That Make Them Distinct” available on www.onefoundation.ie . 
“We are pleased to welcome this report as a contribution to the field, and hope 
it can inspire more people to support advocacy and address the root causes of 
problems and not simply ameliorate the effects or treat the symptoms. 
Advocacy gives a great return on investment, significant social impact can be 
achieved improving the lives of many now, and into the future .”
The One Foundation Team, August 2013
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Executive  
Summary
In a ten-year timeframe, 2004-13, The One 
Foundation invested €75 million, of which 
approximately €15 million (20%) supported 
advocacy work.
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This evaluation analyses the outcomes and impact of The One Foundation’s 
investments in NGOs working in the Irish policy context to advance the following 
advocacy goals:
i) make children’s rights real;  
ii) make immigrant rights real;  
iii) build political will on mental health in Ireland. 
In a ten-year timeframe, 2004-13, The One Foundation (OF) invested €75 million,  
of which approximately €15 million (20%) supported direct advocacy work.
The report draws on meetings with OF Team and Advisory Board members; 
interviews with grantees and ‘bellwethers’ (key informants with insights into 
the policy change process); and desk research (OF and grantee records). The 
evaluation uses a case study approach and a common framework of analysis 
(Quinn-Patton, 2008) to assess effectiveness in the three policy areas with a focus 
on how the work contributed to incremental wins towards achievement of ultimate 
advocacy goals.
Children’s rights
The research shows that the OF provided valuable support to NGOs working 
on advocacy to improve the lives of children and young people and their families. 
Activities conducted (with OF assistance) supported advancements in legislation 
and changes to structures and systems. While many organisations contributed 
to ensuring that a 2012 referendum amending the Irish Constitution to affirm the 
rights of children was put to, and passed by, the Irish people, several bellwethers 
noted the key role played by support to advocacy organisations by OF and The 
Atlantic Philanthropies. The report traces the advocacy steps of a OF grantee, 
the Children’s Rights Alliance (CRA), that contributed to this point of impact. It 
provides examples of CRA’s work in crafting legislation, its lobbying tactics, and its 
monitoring work (a scorecard system to rate progress on children’s rights). While 
the 2012 referendum result is currently (June 2013) the subject of a High Court 
challenge, it will likely provide a legal framework for future case law and advocacy 
efforts. In addition to advocating for a referendum, OF’s grantees successfully 
argued the need for structural and systemic changes to improve the lives of 
vulnerable children and their families. Given current resourcing challenges (due to 
Ireland’s difficult fiscal situation), and historical inertia (in relation to implementation 
of agreed policy in times of plenty), this suggests a need for continued advocacy to 
monitor realisation of proposed changes.
Immigrant rights
On immigrant rights, the support of The One Foundation helped the Migrant 
Rights Centre Ireland (MRCI) to develop a proven track record of influencing 
policy to advance the rights of vulnerable migrant workers and their families. MRCI 
demonstrated the benefits of a community work approach to mobilising migrants to 
be active advocates in campaigns and media work, while working ‘back rooms’ to 
leverage political capital for change, using a strong evidence-base to substantiate 
proposals. Nuanced readers of the policy context, MRCI forged a strategic 
relationship with the Trade Union movement and mobilised allies in the community 
and equality sectors in Ireland and with allies abroad. A concern with national and 
EU policy processes provided horizontal and vertical advocacy routes and points 
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of advocacy influence. Achievements include reforms in secondary legislation 
(‘bridging visa’), labour law (forced labour) and State practices (inspections), 
solidifying the link between migrant workers and the trade union movement 
(ensuring long term support), and raising awareness of the benefits of Ireland’s 
new inter-cultural society. With the re-emergence of emigration after 2008, linked 
to the sharp economic contraction and a rise in unemployment to over 14% of the 
labour force, the climate of opinion towards migrants changed as illustrated by a 
reported rise in racist incidents (MBL poll, 2012). New legislation promised in 2013 
(Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill) may bring clarity and transparency, 
although some campaigners expressed concerns the legislation may be restrictive 
rather than innovative. 
Mental Health 
From 2006, The One Foundation catalysed the area of mental health advocacy 
by strategically funding organisations to build political will to implement the 
government’s stated policy A Vision for Change. Over time, its investments in 
Amnesty International Ireland (specialists in campaigns and lobbying), Mental Health 
Reform (to build a sectoral advocacy platform) and Headstrong (to demonstrate a 
model of integrated mental health services for young people within the community, 
Jigsaw), supported development in a traditionally neglected area of social policy. 
The impact of advocacy work by grantees was evidenced by the extent of political 
engagement (a documented increase in parliamentary questions), establishment 
and operation of a cross-party Oireachtas group and greater political engagement. 
In 2011, the Fine Gael/Labour government included three of the campaign’s 
objectives in its Programme for Government, 2011-2016. These include a review 
of the Mental Health Act, 2011 against human rights standards, and establishing 
a cross-departmental group on mental health. The government has closed virtually 
all of the Victorian institutions that housed people with mental conditions. While 
significant public resources to support community-based mental health supports 
have not yet been forthcoming, reform has begun.
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The evaluation highlights the valuable role that The One Foundation played in 
supporting NGOs to advocate to advance social change. From a philanthropist’s 
point of view, it shows that major social impact can be achieved with relatively small 
amounts of funding. However, expectations must be framed in realistic terms. Since 
the funding of advocacy is considered a higher risk than funding services (because 
of unpredictable variables), factors influencing advocacy success from a funder’s 
perspective include identifying suitable NGO(s) to support and backing the right 
leader to build relationships across various constituencies to ensure a critical mass 
of support for the desired change. 
The evaluation documents the lessons learned in relation to grantees’ advocacy. 
These are discussed in the case studies using the Quinn-Patton (2008) framework 
of advocacy effectiveness. More general lessons regarding support of advocacy, 
tactical issues and advocacy drivers were as follows:
1. Philanthropic support of advocacy can enhance policy-making processes
The One Foundation’s support of NGO advocacy work was important precisely 
because it was independent of government and therefore enabled advocates to 
persist with arguments on the need to improve policy, structures or practices. 
The OF’s commitment to multi-annual funding resourced grantees to develop 
and implement advocacy strategies that included the systematic gathering or 
commissioning of evidence-based research to further substantiate claims for 
change. In the case of mental health advocacy, its investments supported grantees 
to push government to implement its stated policy, and in the case of children’s 
rights, to address its acknowledged responsibilities. This is particularly important 
in a country like Ireland without a strong tradition of think tanks or resources to 
support advocacy and change.
2. Supporting advocacy can be risky and time consuming but,  
if successful, can generate significant longer-term impact
Advocacy activities can take a long time to establish the momentum for change. 
Progress can be stalled by unanticipated policy bottlenecks - human, political or 
economic impediments to advancing the claims for change. For example, national 
economic difficulties hampered delivery by government of promised resources from 
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the annual health budget in support of mental health reforms. Timing is important 
and campaigns may make little progress until conditions are in place for change to 
occur. However, the successful passage of the children’s referendum demonstrates 
advocacy’s potential for longer-term impact. The education arising from advocacy 
campaigns also underpins longer-term attitudinal change and reforms. 
3. Achieving policy change takes time and funders need to be patient
The timeframe for the OF support for change in the three areas outlined was a 
ten-year one. Yet in many ways this is a short horizon. It takes time to gear up 
organisations to drive for this kind of change, to build data to support their cases,  
to shape their image, to engage with politicians and the public etc. Also, 
organisations cannot be expected to get everything right and must have time to 
make some mistakes and learn from them. In the case of immigrant rights for 
example, the reversal of migration trends from inward to outward changed the 
advocacy context and challenges considerably in the space of a decade. Advocacy 
organisations like MRCI had to recalibrate strategies to build momentum within 
a changed environment. Therefore, funding organisations must exercise their 
oversight in a patient and subtle manner. 
4. Sectoral coalitions, while ideal for advocacy, are not always possible
While sectoral coalition building is often important to ensure a critical mass of 
support for change, building agreement between multiple players in an advocacy 
area is a complicated process that cannot be rushed or falsely stimulated. For 
example, immigrant organisations required time to establish their sectoral strategy 
because many had emerged in response to the unanticipated rise in numbers of 
migrants entering Ireland. Therefore, in some advocacy areas, the best that can be 
attained in a limited life investment is campaign collaboration, as illustrated by the 
successful passage of legislation on forced labour in 2013. Such cooperation may 
also lead to cross-learning and potentially longer-term cooperation. 
5. A dedicated advocacy organisation representing member organisations  
in a given sector enhances advocacy impact
In only one of the three advocacy goal areas, children’s rights, was there an 
established umbrella organisation, the Children’s Rights Alliance, whose mission 
was to lobby on behalf of members. Its representative status strengthened its 
hand with government, staff forged working relationships with civil servants and 
with politicians across party lines, produced high-quality analytic submissions and 
coordinated a two-way flow of information that influenced the solutions proffered 
for change. While many organisations and individuals contributed to the successful 
holding of a referendum, the influence of the CRA can be traced from 2006 to the 
point of impact in 2012. 
6. Credible data communicated with real-life examples, propels advocacy
Claims for major change not only require robust evidence-based research 
(preferably a combination of in-house and independently commissioned data), 
but also a communication strategy that is flexible and creative. Campaigns that 
foreground the narratives of those directly affected (e.g. mental health service users 
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and immigrants) and draw on polling data to demonstrate growing public support 
for change (as evidenced by the MBL polling data) contribute to advocacy traction. 
Social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter) played new and important roles in mobilising 
supporters around campaign efforts in all three advocacy areas. 
7. Leadership is critical to successful advocacy 
Advocacy is hugely influenced by the capacity of leaders to collaborate with 
colleagues to build agreement on shared advocacy activities. Within children’s 
rights, for example, CRA’s leaders lobbied on behalf of members behind the 
scenes. They did not assume a public profile, nor claim advocacy wins. They also 
forged relationships across political parties and with public servants so that the 
issue gained traction over time in the system. Strategic NGO leaders who build 
strong, working relationships rather than promoting only their own organisation’s 
interests, seem most adept at advancing advocacy goals.
8. Advocacy capacity is enhanced when organisations review performance 
regularly, learn from mistakes, match tactic to opportunity and alter 
approaches accordingly.
No one style or approach can be relied upon to advance the advocacy issue. 
Organisations must have a toolkit of approaches to suit contexts and opportunities. 
The case studies show that NGOs supported by OF undertook a wide range of 
approaches to achieving their goals. Tactics may change following performance 
reviews. For example, when Amnesty realised that its approach to lobbying of 
officials in the Department of Health was perceived as overly aggressive (at a time 
when Amnesty needed access), the organisation softened its approach. Therefore, 
regular reviews can not only improve advocacy but also influence the tone of a 
campaign at a particular time.
9. Supporting rigour of management, analysis and evaluation in NGOs 
ultimately supports the achievement of their goals. 
Some of the organisations funded by OF were small, e.g. employed fewer than 15 
people. In the Irish NGO sector, they may have had a tradition of relatively low, and 
volatile, funding. As such, strategic planning, organising and overseeing sustained 
advocacy campaigns, working at a strategic policy level, and reporting back to OF 
on outcomes, was organisationally challenging. The rigour involved undoubtedly led 
to organisational capacities being built, which should last as a spin-off benefit of the 
decade of focused advocacy work.
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Introduction
The One Foundation (OF) was co-founded in 
2004 by Declan Ryan and Deirdre Mortell to 
improve the lives of disadvantaged children 
in Ireland and Vietnam. The foundation will 
have invested €75 million, mostly in non-profit 
organisations, over a ten-year period between 
2004 and 2013, in part via co-investments 
with another limited life foundation operating in 
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During its first five years, OF commissioned a range of research on children’s 
issues in Ireland to scope the field, and invested in NGOs to build organisational 
and advocacy capacity and to improve services. Following a review in 2008, the 
foundation identified its advocacy strategy and goals for maximum social impact in 
its remaining years. To achieve these goals, a final series of strategic investments 
was made in a small number of high-performing organisations. 
In June 2012, the foundation appointed an External Evaluator to review its 
advocacy investments. While several investments in 2004-2008 were considered 
retrospective advocacy investments (as the service delivery organisations involved 
also did advocacy), the main focus of the evaluation was on the three advocacy 
goals named in mid-2008:  
ii)   to make children’s rights real (CRs); 
ii)   to make immigrant rights real (IRs), 
iii)  to build political will on mental health (MH). 
This evaluation report analyses the outcomes and impact of the foundation’s 
strategy, investments and supports (including non-monetary supports, e.g.  
business planning) to achieve these advocacy goals. 
The report draws on data gathered between June 2012 and January 2013. 
Evaluation research activities included a review of OF records (2004-12),  
meetings with OF Team and Advisory Board members, media reviews, and 
interviews with grantees and bellwethers (i.e. key actors in the advocacy areas  
to assess activity and predict future trends such as civil servants, politicians,  
NGO leaders, academics and philanthropic personnel). Most interviews were 
conducted in person between June and September 2012. However, some advocacy 
areas were changing considerably during the evaluation, e.g. a referendum on 
children’s rights was held in November 2012. Therefore, additional interviews were 
completed up to January 2013. However, the scope of the evaluation was relatively 
limited, i.e. the guidance was for 20 days of fieldwork and 10 days for data analysis 
and write-up. 
The report has five sections. The remainder of this introduction defines advocacy, 
provides context on the One Foundation, and summarises the evaluation 
methodology used. Sections 2-4 present case studies on the work of grantees to 
achieve the advocacy goals in children’s rights, immigrant rights and mental health. 
Advocacy effectiveness is analysed using Quinn-Patton’s (2008)11 framework to 
highlight lessons learned. The Evaluator had previously applied this framework 
in an evaluation of the Marriage Equality Campaign in Ireland.2 Section 2 profiles 
the Children’s Rights Alliance’s advocacy efforts ‘to make children’s rights real.’ 
Section 3 considers the advocacy approach taken by The Migrant Rights Centre 
Ireland ‘to make immigrant rights real.’ Section 4 differs slightly in that it combines 
an analysis of the foundation’s investments in three organisations - Amnesty 
International Ireland, Mental Health Reform and Headstrong – ‘to build political 
will on mental health’. Section 5 presents the general learning points emerging as 
distinct from those lessons discussed in the sections on each advocacy goal area. 
It highlights concerns reported regarding the sustainability of advocacy work and 
the need for future philanthropic support. 
1.   Michael Quinn-Patton, 2008, Evaluating the Complex (www.aidontheedge.files.wordpress.com/patton_oslo.ppt) and 
Advocacy Impact Evaluation, Journal of MultiDisciplinary Evaluation, Vol. 5, No. 9, March 2008.
2.  O’Carroll Associates & Hibernian Consulting, Marriage Equality: Evaluation Reports, 2010, 2011.  
See www.marriagequality.ie.
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1.1 Advocacy avenues for social change, Ireland 
To properly assess the advocacy effectiveness of the organisations funded, it is 
useful to clarify what the term means and to discuss advocacy avenues in the 
Irish context. The word has its root in the Latin, advocare – to summon or call to 
one’s aid. In this report, advocacy is taken to mean what the Innovation Network 
considers a “wide range of activities conducted to influence decision-makers at 
various levels.”3 Advocacy represents “the strategies devised, actions taken, and 
solutions proposed to inform or influence local” regional and national level policy 
decision-making processes in a democracy.4 
Influencing the policy decision-making processes in Ireland requires an 
understanding of the structures and possibilities for input (see Appendix 1). 
The Irish policy context may differ from other policy contexts in terms of scale 
and accessibility of elected representatives, due to Ireland being a small society 
with significant networking, and an emphasis on clientelist politics where people 
expect politicians to ‘deliver’ locally. Political parties have policy preferences and 
are elected by the people to promote those preferences. However, individual 
politicians elected to serve in the Oireachtas, the national parliament, represent 
their constituencies. Since a concern of most politicians is re-election5, a politician’s 
focus can sometimes (or often) be on more short-term, local concerns, rather than 
long-term policy in the national interest. 
Advocacy represents “the strategies 
devised, actions taken, and solutions 
proposed to inform or influence 
local” regional and national level 
policy decision-making processes 
in a democracy.
Within the legislative policy process, there is a tension between what is deemed 
feasible/possible politically and advocates’ capacity to communicate an argument 
for change effectively. In such a dynamic, change is often incremental. This must 
be understood to properly assess advocacy impact. In addition, irrespective 
of changes of government, as different political parties with particular policy 
preferences are elected by the people, a constant factor in the policy decision-
making process is the presence of civil and public servants in government 
departments and agencies. While these advocacy targets can be difficult to access, 
it is important for advocates to establish a close working relationship with them 
since they contribute to debates on policy positions in critical ways and manage 
the implementation of programmes to achieve policy aims. It can be assumed that 
public servants in key positions may hold policy preferences, stated or unstated, 
that influence the process. Advocacy organisations must therefore also dedicate 
3 The US-based Innovation Network is a valuable advocacy evaluation resource.  See www.innonet.org.
4 Heather Weiss, 2007. Harvard Family Research Program. www.hfrp.org.
5 Niamh Hardiman (2012) Irish Governance in Crisis, Manchester University Press
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time to informing and shifting public opinion to bring pressure to bear on these 
players, an issue that underscores the central role of communications in all 
advocacy work. The emergence of a policy preference is often the result of  
effective communication, requiring convincing evidence, lobbying and access.
Change is often incremental.
 
Ireland is a small, highly networked country, where NGOs can access decision-
makers and thereby influence policy to bring about legislative and social change. 
Measures by the state to promote and financially support NGOs to be involved 
in policy and decision-making processes had been in place for decades.6 The 
voluntary and community sector engaged in national social partnership processes 
with the Irish government, Trade Unionists, business and farming interests to 
address issues in relation to Ireland’s economy and society. 
However, by 2002, when the new Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht 
Affairs took responsibility for all such funding schemes, the funding patterns shifted 
more towards support of organisations providing services and away from advocacy 
organisations (perceived as sometimes too critical of government policy) (Harvey, 
2003). Therefore, the OF decision to support NGOs in advocacy work addressed a 
gap in support and was a timely contribution to Ireland’s social change processes. 
Its support became even more important mid-way through its lifetime, in 2008. With 
Ireland’s economic recession, the partnership approach to policy-making collapsed 
and the state infrastructure to monitor and support rights and equality (e.g. Equality 
Authority, the Human Rights Commission) was downgraded. Essentially there was 
a changed advocacy playing field that required all players to re-think their game plan 
to leverage social change. 
1.2 The One Foundation – Approach and Advocacy Goals
The One Foundation, named after the U2 song, “One,”7 was set up to improve the 
lives of children in Ireland (and Vietnam). The co-founders settled on the concept 
of a limited life, venture philanthropy following a review of available models. The 
foundation also commissioned research to scope the field of children and youth 
issues to inform the range of possibilities for possible intervention. 
The co-founders looked to The Atlantic Philanthropies (AP) as a blueprint for their 
idea: We followed their coat tails. They were the big player and we were the new 
kids in town (EI:5). AP had been active in Ireland since 1990, at first anonymously, 
and later openly building the capacity of Irish universities and supporting the work 
of NGOs in areas such as human rights and children’s issues. While AP was 
much larger in scale ($8 billion globally compared to OF’s €85 million), the idea 
of a limited lifetime foundation took hold. The One Foundation would be active for 
one decade, 2004-2013. By the end of 2013, all operations would stop. However, 
because OF was set to close before AP, the smaller foundation could not benefit 
from the exit learning of the bigger player. 
In addition to AP, the other major influence was the US-based, New Profit model 
of venture philanthropy (www.newprofit.com). OF adapted this approach for the 
6 Freda Donoghue (1998) Defining the Nonprofit Sector – Ireland, John Hopkins Policy Studies.
7 U2’s song “One” ends with: “One life but we’re not the same/we get to carry each other/One/One.”
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Irish context, referring to it as both active philanthropy and venture philanthropy. 
In essence, the idea was to transpose the tools and methods used by venture 
capitalists (who invest in business ideas for monetary profit), to the non-profit 
sector, where the return would be in terms of social impact. Active philanthropy, 
as practiced by OF, involved the following: A high level of engagement, tailored 
financing, multi-year support; non-financial support to help build strategic and 
operational capacity, and an emphasis on performance measurement.
In addition to an Office Manager, the foundation had four Team members who were 
referred to as Portfolio Managers, extending the metaphor of financial investment. 
Each organisation being considered for investment underwent a process of due 
diligence, prior to any commitment to invest. This detailed assessment was followed 
by a period of business planning, facilitated by consultants from leading strategy 
consultancies such as McKinsey and Monitor UK. A commitment to invest in the 
resulting plan was dependent on several factors, including a clear mission fit with 
OF goals, a credible strategic plan and a strong CEO to deliver the plan. 
Once an organisation was selected for funding, the active philanthropic approach 
sometimes translated into involvement on boards, or participation in recruitment of 
CEOs, but always involved performance measurement systems. Such proximity 
to the organisation’s people and its operations facilitated the allocation of tailored 
investments, multi-year funding and suitable non-monetary support (such as access 
to networks or specialists), all with the aim of building the organisational capacity.
However, OF’s investment language did not always fit easy with advocates in the 
Irish context. For some it was a God send, for others, the support was tainted with 
neo-liberalism. Grantee feedback is included in the case studies. As one bellwether 
concluded: To be honest, people were less worried about ideology and where the 
money was coming from and much more focused on getting the money and on 
getting results. We all see the roadblocks (EI:25). 
In terms of its investment strategy, OF’s approach in the three advocacy goal areas 
under consideration evolved as its understanding and knowledge of the fields 
grew, based on collaboration with NGOs, consultations with field specialists, and 
based on commissioned research. By 2008, the half-way point in its lifetime, OF 
acknowledged it was at a critical juncture in terms of future impact and needed 
to assess the best future course (EI:1). A strategic review process, facilitated by 
McKinsey consultants, led to a more focused strategy to get the maximum bang for 
our buck in the final five years (EI: 4). The foundation identified four programmes 
and eight impact goals for achievement between 2008 and 2013.
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Programmes (4) 
1. Children and Families – Families living in disadvantage are supported so that their 
children have the best start in life.  
2. Integration – Minorities are integrated into Irish society so that their children have 
the same rights and opportunities as others’ children.  
3. Youth Mental Health – Young people have the resilience to make good choices 
and can get help when they need it.  
4. Social Entrepreneurship – A flourishing social entrepreneurship movement where 
the next generation of social entrepreneurs has the practical and moral support they 
need to grow and thrive.
Impact Goals (8)
1. Improve young people’s resilience; 2. Build political will on mental health (AGA); 3. 
Improve mental health system outcomes for young people; 
4. Make children’s rights real (AGA);  
5. Make effective family support programmes available nationally;  
6. Make multi-denominational education a real option in Ireland;  
7. Make immigrant rights real (AGA);  
8. Build the field of social entrepreneurship in Ireland & Vietnam. 
[The evaluation concerns only Advocacy Goals 2, 4 and 7]
Larger sums of money, and more strategic supports were offered to those 
organisations whose work matched OF’s goals and were considered high-
performers based on OF’s performance assessment (it used a Balanced Score 
Card system for ongoing monitoring of outcomes). Amounts invested are  
discussed in the case studies. The strategic shift flagged at this point was a 
concerted commitment to support and promote high potential, high performing 
advocacy and systems change organisations and efforts. 
In addition to identifying its eight advocacy goals across its four programmes in 
20088, OF commissioned Wilson Hartnell consultants to conduct an Advocacy 
Gap Analysis produced in 2009 to identify “if grantees had enough and the right 
capacity” to achieve their goals. Two key findings from this process were:  
i)   organisations with the ability to identify an advocacy opportunity and move  
on it fast were often most successful; 
ii)   sectoral capacity in the advocacy goal area was linked to “maturity of the  
issue,” i.e. if the issue was a relatively recent one such as immigrant rights  
or an established issue such as children’s rights. 
A final point on OF relates to the question of a philanthropic organisation’s right to 
intervene in social change processes in any democracy, OF has identified three 
roles regarding what it frames as its legitimacy:
8  Alistair Hodgett & Aoife Sweeney, Wilson Hartnell (Ogilvy PR), Advocacy Gap Analysis, 2009.  
See www.onefoundation.ie
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1. Innovation - Philanthropy can fund and finance innovation, provide risk 
capital, something no government in the world finances because governments 
are conservative with taxpayers’ money, and they need an evidence base to 
allocate (EI:1); 
2. Supporting Voices – to “amplify the voices” of the most marginalized, or those  
at an early stage of self advocacy. The logic is that since children and most migrants 
do not have votes, it is hard for them to have their rights addressed without 
advocacy, as is also sometimes the case with people suffering mental  
health problems (especially in an institutional context); 
3. Humanitarian Role - Universal and therefore non controversial. From OF’s 
point of view, the advocacy goal areas identified were non controversial: we’re 
about children mainly, (EI:2), and our advocacy positions are largely aligned with 
social policy (EI:1). 
1.3 Evaluation Approach
Given the complexity of advocacy processes, the ambitious goals set by OF, 
and the limited timeframe to effect change (10 years), the report’s narrative is 
fundamentally about incremental policy wins - points of achievement on the journey 
towards the ultimate goals. 
The evaluation draws on a review of the relevant OF records (2004-2012),  
media reviews, interviews with the foundation’s Team and Advisory Board members 
and interviews with grantees and bellwethers. Of the total interviews (33), 8 
were with OF people (4 Team, 4 Advisory Board), 9 with OF grantees, and 16 
with bellwethers (including policy-makers, civil servants, politicians, academics, 
members of the media and staff of philanthropic bodies). Given the scope of the 
evaluation (20 days for fieldwork and 10 for analysis and write-up), the focus is 
on documenting key lessons learned in the three policy areas, and is not a full 
evaluation of OF work in Ireland over a ten-year period. 
 
Framework for Effective Advocacy (Quinn-Patton, 2008) 
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The evaluation uses Quinn-Patton’s (2008) framework above (Advocacy Impact 
Evaluation) in its analysis of advocacy effectiveness - a framework applied in the 
Irish context in 2010 (O’Carroll Associates and Hibernian Consulting). As such, 
it assesses advocacy based on six interconnected factors (as shown), each 
dynamically interacting and proven to contribute to effective advocacy efforts. Case 
study sites selected in consultation with OF provided a deeper understanding of 
organisations’ advocacy experience. The case studies sites were: Children’s Rights 
Alliance, The Migrant Rights Centre Ireland and the blended case study for the 
mental health advocacy goal concerns the work of Amnesty (Ireland), Mental Health 
Reform and Headstrong. In each case, the evaluation recognised the learning from 
partial advocacy wins based on political realism, or compromise, or put another 
way, what was politically feasible at the time. 
Other methodological factors were: 
The need to understand that policy processes and priorities shift based on external 
factors such as the economic recession and political uncertainty when certain 
changes may no longer assume the status they had at the outset of the initiative; 
The need to capture learning from advocacy measures outside the normal channels 
such as direct lobbying of individuals, without threatening the players involved. 
With that in mind, all interviews were digitally recorded, though quotes used are not 
attributed, but are identified by the use of italics and an interview code: EI:X. 
The matrix below provides an overview of the evaluation approach, outlining 
the inputs, number of grantees in each advocacy goal area, the criteria used 
for assessment of advocacy effectiveness and finally, the format of the final 
evaluation report.
Matrix 1. One Foundation Advocacy, 2004-2013, Evaluation Approach
Inputs Grantees (17)* Assessing Advocacy impact Evaluation Data & Output
Total OF investments  
2004-2013: €75 million
Total investment in 3 Advocacy  
Goals: approx. €15 million
CR = €5.2 million 
IRs = €4.8 million 
MH = €4.8 million
Plus Supports: Engagement  
(e.g. board) Performance  
Assessment Business  
Planning Networks





Mental Health  
(6 organisations)




Strong high capacity coalitions
Strong national  
grassroots coordination
Disciplined and focused messages 
with effective communications
Timely, opportunistic lobbying  
and engagement
Solid research and knowledge base
Collaborating funders,  
strategic funding
Data: foundation records, 
media reviews, interviews 
with grantees, NGO leaders, 
civil servants, politicians, 
academics, media and 
philanthropic reps etc.
Case studies x 3 advocacy 
goal areas (with one blended 
case study) that form the  
core of the 
Final Report i.e. narrative 
analysis of OF Advocacy 
Support
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Making Children’s  
Rights Real
The following is an overview of the position of 
children in Irish society highlighting inadequacies 
in state supports for vulnerable children and their 
families. A discussion of the One Foundation’s 
advocacy goal and strategy follows, and a case 
study of the Children’s Rights Alliance assesses 
advocacy activities and effectiveness, and 
presents lessons learned. 
2
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2.1 Children, Ireland
For OF, the core of its efforts from 2004 to 2013 related to improving the lives of 
vulnerable children. In the early 2000s, child poverty was a real and documented 
issue in Ireland, despite the fact that the state provided a universal monthly 
children’s allowance for each child, irrespective of family income1. As Fintan 
O’Toole concluded, at a time when Ireland was ranked the most globalised nation in 
the world (Globalisation Index, 2003), “for many families, even at the height of the 
boom, the wolf was at the door.”2 
In 2005, the government’s Combat Poverty Agency reported that some 148,000 
children were living in consistent poverty in Ireland, which means living with a 
family income of less than 60% of the median income and lacking other basics 
such as adequate heating, warm meals, and a good strong pair of shoes.3 
Parental unemployment was a key factor contributing to childhood poverty. 
Additional factors compounded the problem, including poor quality parenting, 
nutrition, neighbourhoods, housing and so forth. Economic and social issues in 
combination with a cycle of adult unemployment, intergenerational poverty and 
breakdown of traditional family and community supports were at the centre of 
childhood disadvantage in Ireland. Other barriers to addressing change in child 
poverty were more directly reflective of longstanding policy shortcomings such as 
insufficient investment in health and education, and systematic weaknesses such 
as insufficient numbers of service providers to support children in need and limited, 
affordable childcare. 
Barnardos, the main NGO in Ireland delivering programmes to help children and 
their families via community-based centres and national services, concluded that: 
“Children living in poverty live life in the margins, excluded from opportunities and 
often unable to break the cycle of intergenerational poverty. Poverty affects every 
aspect of a child’s life having short and long term consequences on their health, 
education outcomes and life chances.”4 
Children’s issues were not a political priority and, without a vote, children’s voices 
and issues were seldom heard in political processes. Advocates were required to 
speak for children to ensure their voices and needs did inform the political choices. 
While it is true that children do not vote in any country, a further possible factor of 
relevance in Ireland was that the Irish Constitution (1937) largely ignores children, 
apart from referring to their education rights. In addition, the constitutional position 
reflected the primacy of the family over the individual historically, in line with Catholic 
church teaching, a major influence at the time.5 
The relationship between the Catholic church and the Irish state was a close one 
through the 20th century and many vulnerable children were entrusted by the state 
into the care of religious congregations. Reports of appalling abuse of children in 
industrial schools (and elsewhere) were not much heeded until recently.  
1  See Understanding Childhood Deprivation in Ireland, Dorothy Watson and Bertrand Maitre (ESRI) and Christopher 
Whelan, UCD, ESRI, Dublin, 2012, www.esri.ie/publications.  
2  Fintan O’Toole, After the Ball, 2003. See pages 4-5, Foreign Policy Magazine’s Globalisation Index, 2003 based on 
three measures – economic integration, technology, political engagement and personal contact.
3 Ending Child Poverty, 2005. Combat Poverty Agency. Dublin.
4  Barnardos lists key statistics from the EU SILC that chart trends for 2008-2011 in relation to consistent poverty, 
deprivation etc. www.barnardos.ie/child-poverty.html
5  The Irish Constitution’s main architect, Eamon de Valera, consulted regularly with the future Archbishop of Dublin,  
John Charles McQuaid during the drafting process. See Diarmaid Ferriter, The Transformation of Ireland 1900-2000, 
Profile Books, 2004, p.369.
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In February 1996, Louis Lentin broadcast his Dear Daughter documentary on RTÉ 
about Christine Buckley’s experience in Goldenbridge residential school from 1950 
to 1964. Her allegations against the Sisters of Mercy caused a wave of media 
reports. This was followed by two documentaries by the late journalist Mary Raftery. 
Findings from her investigations were broadcast in two TV series – States of Fear 
(April/May 1999) and Cardinal Secrets (2002). All three documentaries aired on the 
national broadcast network, RTÉ, shocked the nation.
Children’s issues were not a political 
priority and, without a vote, children’s 
voices and issues were seldom heard 
in political processes.
Raftery’s documentaries expanded the investigation beyond one case to expose the 
systematic abuse of children and cover-up by the Irish government and Catholic 
church. As a result of her findings in the States of Fear documentary, the Irish 
government established the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse (CICA) in 
1999 to investigate the extent and effects of abuse on children from 1936 onwards 
in the 60 residential reform and industrial schools in Ireland, run by religious 
organisations, but funded and supervised by the Department of Education. The 
Commission’s findings were that children were treated like prison inmates and 
slaves, subjected to physical, emotional and sexual abuse, and ritualised beatings. 
Since it appears that the majority of children in institutional care were from poor 
families, the documentaries demonstrated how social class was a major factor in 
how the State cared for its children. 
The broadcasting of Cardinal Secrets in 2002 led to the setting up of a Commission 
of Investigation into clerical abuse in the Roman Catholic Dublin Archdioceses from 
1974-2004. Published in 2009, the report found that secrecy and avoidance of 
scandal were the main priorities of the church and that the complaints of parents 
and children were ignored.
Responsibility for children lay within the remit of the Department of Health and 
Children (1997-2011). While each successive Minister with responsibility for 
children since 1998 introduced some measures to improve the situation for children, 
issues arose in relation to implementation consistently. For example, Minister Mary 
Hanafin, TD, introduced a National Children’s Strategy (2000); Minister Brian 
Lenihan, TD, advanced the idea of referendum; Minister Barry Andrews, TD, 
brought in the universal pre-school year (a successful and much lauded measure), 
and under the watch of the current (full) Minister, Frances Fitzgerald, the children’s 
referendum has been held and a Child and Family Agency is being developed. 
Therefore, politicians and policy-makers have sought to put in place some changes 
to improve children’s lives, including establishing an Office of the Ombudsman for 
Children in 2003. 
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However, pockets of progress in relation to legislation to protect children have often 
proved inadequate in practice. For example, despite the existence of the 1991 
Child Care Act (that requires the state’s health authorities to identify children not 
receiving the necessary care), throughout the 1990s a series of abuse scandals 
were reported in the media that highlighted instances of abuse of children in the 
family home (1995, McColgan Case) and in organisations where adults interacted 
with children, such as the Irish Amateur Swimming Association (1993). In addition, 
according to Harvey (2011), detailed guidelines to protect children, contained in 
the document Children First (1999 revised in 2011), were not operational, data 
on services for children were patchy and in disorder, and the government did not 
appear to seek advice from NGOs providing grassroots services and supports. 
Despite the existence of the government’s Children’s Services Committee and a 
Prevention and Early Intervention Programme, Harvey also notes that it remains 
unclear to what extent the measures have any impact on the lives of children.6 
Therefore, OF work to improve the lives of children took place in a context where 
Ireland needed to seriously address its policy and practice in relation to children, 
child poverty and protection. 
2.1.1 Advocacy Goal 4 & Strategy – ‘Make children’s rights real’
This advocacy goal – to make children’s rights real - is at the heart of all of The One 
Foundation’s (OF) activities and its operations: It is embedded in all of our work 
and our advocacy (EI:1). It was the primary motivator for the establishment of OF, 
based on the two co-founders’ experience of working with Barnardos (Ireland’s 
main NGO supporting children and families through a range of services). Declan 
Ryan was Chair of the Barnardos board for a number of years, and Deirdre Mortell 
was responsible for Barnardos’ fundraising and public campaigns.
During its strategic review in 2008, OF explored the causes of childhood 
disadvantage to chart a course of strategic intervention. Given the enormity and 
complexity of the underlying problem of disadvantaged children, and with a five-year 
timeframe, OF concluded a significant barrier to effecting change in the area and 
to improving the lives of disadvantaged children was the fact that children’s rights 
were not included in Ireland’s Constitution. In addition, two other target areas were 
identified for advocacy impact: policy implementation and service delivery. The idea 
was to change policy and thereby influence the direction of the state’s resources 
towards ensuring improved structures and systems to support children’s wellbeing. 
Therefore, all three targets were to address the main issues - an absence of any 
legal or constitutional basis for children’s rights, inadequate implementation of 
government policies and poor practices in terms of services. In the final analysis, 
the bull’s eye – ‘to make children’s rights real’ - was to embed children’s rights 
in the Constitution while also seeking to improve policy and practices in order to 
maximise positive outcomes for disadvantaged children. 
 
 
6   Brian Harvey, A Way Forward for Delivering Children’s Services, a report for Barnardos, 2011.  
www.barnardos.ie
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OF work to improve the lives of 
children took place in a context where 
Ireland needed to seriously address 
its policy and practice in relation to 
children, child poverty and protection. 
2.1.2 Investments, 2004-2013
Initially the idea was to invest a million into each organisation, but it was clear that 
many, many NGOs were institutionally weak and underdeveloped. There was a 
real weakness in terms of leadership and organisational capacity. That had to be 
strengthened first. That was the starting point. (EI:21).
Investments made up to 2008 were to build organisational capacity to either scale 
up or to grow advocacy capacity. For example over €5 million was invested in 
Barnardos between 2004-2008, of which 25% was designated in support of 
advocacy activities. Barnardos is the premier, national, respected programme-based 
service organisation, whose activities aim to “mitigate the disabling effects  
of disadvantage.”7 
While the investment was directed at ensuring that Barnardos provide more and 
better services, advocacy outcomes were also expected, a factor that influenced 
the CEO selection process: [The OF] helped put a really bright person in place in 
Barnardos (EI:5). The CEO appointed (Fergus Finlay) was a nationally-recognised 
advocate on social justice issues, who had served as Senior Advisor in a previous 
government. He therefore knew first-hand the internal machinations of politics and 
government, parliamentary procedures and civil service operations. With OF’s 
investment, Barnardos added further to its advocacy capacity. It employed an 
Advocacy Director (Norah Gibbons, an internal appointment), another nationally-
respected children’s rights advocate, someone who had worked in the area of 
child protection in UK and in Ireland and was subsequently appointed to numerous 
government committees and advisory bodies.
Next to Barnardos, the second highest investment in 2004-08 of over a half million 
euros was to the Children’s Rights Alliance (CRA), an organisation where advocacy 
is the primary activity. CRA is a coalition of more than 100 organisations (including 
Barnardos), working to secure the rights of children in Ireland by campaigning for 
changes in law, policies, services and for implementation of the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. With OF’s grant, CRA developed a strong business plan, 
put in place performance measurement systems, and developed its governance and 
management systems. These improvements were to shore up the advocacy work, 
in particular lobbying (with civil servants and representatives of all political parties) 
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Three smaller investments were made in 2004-2008. In the area of Migrant Separated 
Children, research was commissioned to determine the extent and nature of the 
problem to establish equity of care for these children, because this vulnerable group 
was absent from national migrant data.8 The investment in Best Place was for a new 
initiative to embed and realise children’s rights at community level.9 By 2009, two 
additional investments were made in Longford Women’s Link (working with migrant, 
refugee and asylum seeker women and their children), and Stand Up for Children 
(later Campaign for Children, to educate the public about children’s rights).
 
Organisation 2004-2008 € Amount, % advocacy 2009-2013 € Amount, % advocacy
Children’s Rights Alliance 517,800 (100%) 1,269,200 (100%)
SUFC - 703,500 (100%)
Separated Children 139,000 (100%) 285,000 (100%)
Best Place 108,462 (100%) -
Barnardos 1,288,250 (25% of 5,153,000) 790,680 (44% of 1,797,000)
Longford Women’s Link - 151,600 (20% of 758,000)
TOTAL €2,053,512 €3,199,980
Organisations, Investment Amount, Children’s Rights Advocacy, 2004-2013
2.1.3 The Push for Advocacy Impact
Advocacy investments accounted for 31% of spend in the area of Children’s 
Rights during the first five years, and 66% in the remaining five years. The matrix 
below illustrates the investment shift and reflects the evolution in OF thinking on the 
importance of supporting advocacy as opposed to services:
 
2004-2008 2009-2013
Total CRs investments 6,533,162 4,812,700
Advocacy investments 2,053,512 (31%) 3,199,980 (66%)
TOTAL €11,345,862 of which advocacy accounted for a total of €5,253,492
Total Investments €, Children’s Rights AGA, 2004-2013
Several factors influenced OF’s change in focus. These included a sense of 
urgency with only five years remaining and a strong push by members of the 
Advisory Group I was pushing the agenda, even though Declan was not keen 
because advocacy was very public (EI:21). An important insight was that by 
supporting services, OF might be allowing government to shun its service 
8  Anthony Finn & Hilary Curley, 2007, Missing: Research into Separated Children Gone Missing from State Care.  
www.onefoundation.ie
9  Research conducted by Middlequarter, Ireland and academic Roger Hart, USA, resulted in a plan and tools for working 
with children from an early stage in urban communities.
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responsibilities: you could keep providing services forever, whereas if you  
changed legislation you guaranteed long-term change (EI:5). 
The naming of the goal, to make children’s rights real, reflects the evolution of OF’s 
thinking and its appreciation of the potential value of advocacy in terms of achieving 
constitutional change and policy implementation, thereby ensuring better long-term 
outcomes for children. The objectives and indicators of achievement of the goal 
(2008) were: 
 Law and Constitution  
–  secure children’s rights in Constitution - via a referendum on  
children’s rights. 
Policy and Implementation  
–  ensure children’s rights in policy – implement the recommendations  
of the Ryan Report Implementation Plan 2009.10 
Practice and Service Delivery  
–  improve delivery of children’s services.
With the clear identification of its advocacy strategy, objectives and outcomes, 
OF doubled its advocacy investments. The Children’s Rights Alliance became the 
primary advocacy driver in OF’s portfolio for 2009-2013, reflected in the investment 
of €1,269,200 (100% dedicated to advocacy), compared to a €790,680 
investment in Barnardos (44% of its total grant of €1,797,000). Both NGOs had 
different and complementary advocacy styles that used public and private advocacy 
routes to advance children’s rights. 
CRA’s senior management (Jillian van Turnhout, CEO and Maria Corbett, Legal & 
Policy Director) combined skills in political lobbying and policy analysis with CRA’s 
representative status (100+ members) to conduct successful elite advocacy at 
ministerial level, with civil servants and other state insiders. CRA’s advocacy was 
not targeted at changing public attitudes. While Barnardos was primarily involved 
in service provision (supported under a separate OF goal), it had a CEO with a 
public presence and very good communication skills. Barnardos’ Advocacy Director 
was a respected national expert in the area of children at risk, someone who liaised 
directly with the minister’s office. Therefore, high performing advocates amplified 
the call for change on children’s rights.
Additional investments made under this goal were to complement the advocacy 
work conducted by Children Rights Alliance and Barnardos. For example, the 2011 
investment in Stand Up For Children (SUFC) was made in partnership with The 
Atlantic Philanthropies to educate the public about children’s rights. Retired High 
Court Judge Catherine McGuinness , the first person to identify the constitutional 
gap in terms of children’s rights, became chair of the organisation.11 Finally, 
exceptional investments were also made. For example, as plans for a new Child 
and Family Agency (CFA) were being formulated, OF partnered with AP and the 
10 Ryan Report Implementation Plan – www.dcya.gov.ie/RyanImplementation
11  Catherine McGuiness. Report of the Kilkenny Incest Investigation, 1993. Government Publications. 
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department to support the agency’s development. This exceptional investment was 
made because of the strategic importance of the agency and the opportunity to 
“get it right the first time,” in order to support vulnerable children and their families. 
Finally, in 2012, OF supported the Child Care Law Reporting Project (with AP and 
the department) and the Children’s Law Centre.
2.2 Key Achievements 
 Law & Constitution  
Referendum passed in 2012, though the result is subject to a High Court challenge, 
children’s rights will likely be embedded in Ireland’s Constitution. Legislation 
approved to allow Court Researcher to monitor proceedings of District Courts and 
to report annually on findings. 
Policy Implementation 
Senior (Cabinet) Minister for Children in government. Incremental moves on the 
Ryan Implementation Report, more Social Worker posts, “Children First” policy 
revised, universal pre-school year.
Structural 
Steps taken to establish a new dedicated Child and Family Agency, change 
management processes taking place, new monitoring and accountability systems 
for support of children and families.
 Practice/Service Delivery 
New HIQA (Health Information and Quality Authority) standards/monitoring  
system in relation to child protection and welfare (July 2012). 
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2.2.1 Referendum on Children’s Rights - Advocacy win
On November 10th 2012, the people of Ireland voted to strengthen children’s 
rights in the Irish Constitution after what was described as a lacklustre campaign, 
attributable primarily to the fact that the ‘Yes’ campaign had widespread support 
among Irish voters: Who was going to be against children’s rights? (EI:8). Some 
58% of those who voted supported the referendum, with 40 of 43 geographic 
constituencies supporting the change. The fact that the government prioritised 
a referendum on children’s rights in the context of an economic recession was 
generally accepted as evidence of advocacy impact. The result provided: A unique 
opportunity ... We have failed earlier generations [of children]. This is a positive 
legacy for all generations to come. (EI:31) 
The amendment, with several provisions,  
a) recognises the rights of the child;  
b)  recalibrates the trigger for State intervention in the family where the welfare or 
safety of the child is negatively affected, and 
c)  enshrines the State’s duty to pass laws to make adoption available to all children. 
In addition, in certain judicial proceedings, it makes 
d)  the best interests of the child paramount and ensures that the child’s views are 
heard.12 In an Irish context, this is a radical shift in locating children at the centre 
of judicial decision-making and acknowledging their right to have their voices 
heard in matters affecting them. 
Subject to a positive outcome from the current High Court challenge, the result 
requires the parliament (Oireachtas) to legislate to make these provisions happen in 
practice. Some parts of the amendment wording are specifically “limited to judicial 
proceedings, and to the family law setting.” Therefore, OF and AP partnered with 
the Minister for Children and Youth Affairs, to financially support the development of 
a Child Care Law Reporting Project (each partner provides a third of the costs).13 
According to Professor Ursula Kilkelly, the change (pending) to the Irish 
Constitution provides enormous advocacy opportunities for children’s rights in the 
future: “Skilled advocates and lawyers can use the Constitution to ensure the legal 
system works for children by holding the State to account and providing an effective 
remedy to children whose rights are ignored or violated.”14 There is also the 
potential to draw on established UN and European law to argue for more expansive 
children’s rights (work being undertaken by the Children’s Rights Alliance). 
2.3 Case Study – Children’s Rights Alliance  
(www.childrensrights.ie)
This section discusses the work of one of OF’s grantees, the Children’s Rights 
Alliance (CRA), to understand the actions taken to contribute to the achievement of 
the advocacy goal, and lessons learned during the campaign. The focus is primarily 
on CRA’s work in relation to the referendum, not all of its advocacy work. 
12  The Children’s Referendum will insert a new article ‘Children’ in the Constitution. It will be numbered Article 42A and will 
be located between Articles 42 and 43. There are four parts to Article 42A: (42A.1), (42A.2 – with two parts, 42A.2.1 
and 42A.2.2), (42A.3) and (42A.4 – with two parts, 42A.4.1 and 42A.4.2).
13  Dr. Carol Coulter will monitor and report on the proceedings of the district courts where childcare cases are heard 
involving applications by the HSE for orders to protect children. www.childlawproject.ie.
14 Professor Ursula Kilkelly, Irish Times article, November 7, 2012.
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2.3.1 Background, Activities & Milestones
Established in 1995, the Children’s Rights Alliance (CRA) is a coalition of over 100 
organisations working to secure the rights of children in Ireland. The core focus 
of CRA’s work is to advocate for the full implementation of the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (ratified by Ireland in 1992). The organisation aims to 
improve the lives of all children under 18 though “securing the necessary changes 
in Ireland’s laws, policies and services.” A core (founding) objective of CRA was 
to have the Irish Constitution amended to strengthen the rights of children. 
Key CRA activities in pursuit of its goals have been to: 
1.  build consensus with member organisations (on the contents of Shadow Reports 
to UN, to push for change in Ireland, and in relation to wording of a potential 
constitutional amendment; 
2.  advocate within government (to build agreement on the need for a referendum 
and to inform the wording of the amendment), 
3.  advocate ou tside government (with the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 
to “influence their recommendations to the Government of Ireland in favour of an 
explicit acknowledgement of the constitutional rights of children”).
CRA’s success in building political will across political parties is evidenced by the 
fact that the momentum for change continued to build under four different Ministers 
for Children and Youth Affairs (Brian Lenihan, Brendan Smith, Barry Andrews 
and Frances Fitzgerald), and through three different governments. In addition, 
the elevation of current Minister Frances Fitzgerald to full ministerial status (as 
recommended by CRA), with a seat at Cabinet, is further evidence of advocacy 
impact. The diagram below captures the main elements of CRA’s advocacy 
approach alongside key milestones on the journey to this historic, significant 
advocacy win. 
ImpactA  ‘Elite Insider’ Lobbying: 
 
UN Committee on Rights of the Child  
(leverage to influence Irish government)
Ministers, Senior Civil Servants 
(Build political will and contribute solutions, 
amendment wording)
 Cross-party Politicians  
(build consensus momentum for change)
 
B  Sectoral Lobbying: 
 
Member organisations (agree Shadow  Report  
& wording, campaign for a ‘yes’ vote)
Advocacy Activities X Target Law: Referendum Passes
€€€







Children’s Rights Alliance (CRA) 2005 - 2013 Key Milestones
2006 – UN Shadow Report; Referendum announced; Draft 1, wording;  
2007 – Oireachtas Committee appointed to agree wording;  
2010 – Draft 2 wording;  
2011 – Full cabinet Minister for Children, committed to referendum;  
2012 – September wording announced; November referendum passed.
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From the outset, OF support was critical to CRA’s path to advocacy success.  
It participated on the panel to recruit a new CEO in 2005 to lead the organisation 
through a new phase of organisational development and campaigning. This person, 
Jillian van Turnhout, was subsequently appointed to Seanad Éireann (the upper 
House of Parliament) in 2011, a move interpreted by many observers as evidence of 
CRA’s successful advocacy impact. It was the Taoiseach’s (Prime Minister’s) call 
…to have her shepherd the referendum through the Seanad (EI:1). Legal/policy 
analyst Maria Corbett prepared robust policy submissions that explained complex 
legal matters in accessible terms. The current CEO (Tanya Ward) has been Deputy 
CEO of the Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL), and is an experienced legal 
human rights advocate/scholar (a specialist on the Irish judiciary). This will be 
important because: It’s how the courts interpret the wording that will impact on  
the practice on the ground (EI:6).
Up to the successful passage of the referendum on children’s rights, much of 
CRA’s advocacy work took the form of insider lobbying, i.e. direct engagement 
with government Ministers, civil servants and politicians with a view to raising their 
awareness and informing them of possible routes to effect change, crucially through 
holding a referendum. Perceived as a player across all parties, CRA informed 
party political policies, monitored government performance (using a scorecard 
system), and contributed to drafting the final legislation. Elite advocacy at UN level 
provided additional leverage to prompt the Irish government in the direction of a 
referendum.15 There were times we felt we were really out on a limb, that the push 
for a referendum could collapse us. They [The One Foundation] told us all along 
‘We’ll watch your back. Just keep doing what you’re doing.’ We knew they really 
wanted the referendum to happen. It gave us tremendous confidence. (EI:7)
15  Work in relation to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child continues to be the backdrop for activities. The UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child’s monitoring body for the UN Convention examined Ireland’s progress in 2006 and 
called on Ireland to incorporate children’s rights into its domestic law – Concluding Observations of the Committee, U.N. 
Doc. CRA/C/IRL/CO/2, 29th September 2006.
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2.3.2 Key Achievements – Advocacy wins & Impact:
2006 
CRA submits Shadow Report to UN, based on input from member organisations, 
and presents case for a referendum: From Rhetoric to Rights, Second Shadow 
Report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Children’s Rights  
Alliance, 2006.
Minister for Children, Brian Lenihan, TD asks the CRA in its capacity as the 
main umbrella body for children’s NGOs, to consult the sector to inform the 
government’s formulation of wording for the constitutional amendment.
2007 
 
CRA submission: ‘The Constitution and Children: A Position Paper on 
theProposed Referendum on Children’s Rights, 2007,’ outlined core principles. 
The government published its proposed wording in 2007’ (influenced by CRA’s 
submission), prior to General Election. All political parties now committed to 
referendum.
The new Government established an Oireachtas Committee on the 
Constitutional Amendment on Children to facilitate an examination of the 
proposal for a constitutional referendum, to build consensus on amendment 
wording, and to make recommendation to the Oireachtas. Children’s rights 
discussed in this high-level parliamentary forum for several years, with significant 
inputs by the CRA to the committee’s three reports.
2010 
 
Third report of Joint Committee with all-party agreement on a proposed 
referendum wording. Government refers this to the Attorney General and senior 
civil servants for review.
2011 
 
In January, Minister for Children and Youth Affairs disseminated a 
proposedamendment wording to NGOs and all parties,
2011 
 
General election campaign, each of the political parties manifestos contained 
acommitment to a referendum, a promise that was subsequently contained in the 
Programme for Government in March 2011.16
In November 2012, the referendum was held, and passed.
16 Towards Recovery: Programme for a National Government 2011-2016.
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Therefore, from 2006 onwards, it is possible to track a growing momentum for 
change, reflected in the substantive steps taken to build consensus around the idea 
of a referendum and its wording. Remembering that The One Foundation support 
began in 2005, the investment (along with that of The Atlantic Philanthropies, 
the other main funder) contributed to building the capacity of the organisation, 
and improving its advocacy until September 2012, when the referendum was 
announced. At that point, CRA shifted gear into serious campaign mode to build 
on its earlier advocacy work.17 The following section discusses CRA’s advocacy 
effectiveness, and lessons arising from the experience, using the Quinn-Patton 
analytical framework. 
2.3.3 Advocacy Effectiveness 
A  Strong High Capacity Coalitions
The Children’s Rights Alliance (CRA) membership is located throughout Ireland and 
includes a wide array of organisations, mainly service providers, including national 
representative bodies, local youth groups, human rights and disability groups.  
CRA is first and foremost an advocacy organisation with a mission to influence 
policy formulation and implementation. Its role as a representative body has given 
the organisation added advocacy legitimacy, and facilitated access to government, 
especially when the idea of a referendum was being promoted and negotiated: 
Government love consortia. They listen when there’s a mandate (EI:9). 
CRA successfully facilitated agreement by its members on a Shadow Report, 
submitted to the UN in 2006, following a series of workshops and individual 
consultations.18 This document presented a unified, agreed position for 
constitutional change and was the catalyst for spurring the government to commit 
to the referendum. CRA was the only NGO invited by government to hear the 
Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, TD, announce his intention to amend the Constitution 
(November 2006). On the basis of its engagement in the UN review and monitoring 
process, CRA was approached by the Minister for Children, Brian Lenihan, TD, 
and asked to consult with other NGOs working on children’s issues regarding 
referendum wording. The resulting document “The Constitution and Children:  
A Position Paper on the Proposed Referendum on Children’s Rights” was 
presented to the Minister in 2007. 
Government love consortia.  
They listen when there’s a mandate.
 
Many of the principles advocated by the CRA in its submission were reflected in 
the subsequent bill produced by government “Twenty-eighth Amendment of the 
Constitution Bill 2007.” This demonstrates the government’s recognition of CRA’s 
mandate, the quality and credibility of its policy submissions, but also provides 
evidence of CRA’s policy impact at national and UN levels on behalf of its  
member organisations.
17 See Summary of Referendum Campaign Activities, www.childrensrights.ie
18 From Rhetoric to Rights, Second Shadow Report, UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRA, 2006.
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In the intervening years, civil servants and politicians continued to consult with 
CRA in recognition of its status as coalition leader. Its response to the Ryan Report 
(2006), ‘Learning from the Past,’ influenced the government’s implementation 
plan. Based on the submission, CRA was granted a seat on the inter-departmental 
monitoring group for the plan, the only independent body participating: “The role 
of the Alliance in bringing together and speaking for a broad membership is highly 
valued by senior civil servants and political leaders.”19
Examples of CRA’s efforts to build a strong coalition to advance children’s 
constitutional rights were in evidence in 2010 and again in 2012. In 2010, CRA 
collaborated with Barnardos under the banner of “Saving Childhood Ryan” (a 
group of eight organisations) to promote findings emerging from an opinion poll on 
public attitudes to the proposed referendum.20 The poll demonstrated widespread 
support among the Irish people for the proposed referendum (62% of respondents 
reporting they would vote in favour of it). Once the referendum was announced, 
CRA assumed a much more public profile. It developed and disseminated a suite 
of materials to explain why a referendum was needed, engaged with various 
media, and conducted briefings with parliamentarians and key advocacy targets. 
Its Constitutional Working Group (formed in March 2012, before the referendum 
announcement) ensured a two-way information flow with member organisations 
during the campaign. Members were updated regularly via email, briefings, and 
phone calls. Some 77 member organisations adopted public positions calling for a 
“Yes” vote, and CRA arranged media training for 25 organisations. 
CRA also participated in the “Yes for Children” campaign. This coalition consisted 
of a number of children’s organisations that came together to campaign jointly 
for a yes vote.21 Despite agreement to collaborate under the “Yes for Children” 
campaign banner, some bellwethers reported that “solo runs” by certain member 
organisations diluted the public perception of a unified campaign force. 
The main lesson emerging is that CRA’s legitimacy as an umbrella body 
(representing over 100 organisations and 300 individuals supportive of children’s 
rights) provided valuable insider advocacy access to parliamentarians and policy 
makers because it presented a unified sectoral position on avenues for change on 
children’s rights. CRA’s wide membership base provided a nation-wide platform 
for mobilisation once the referendum campaign kicked into gear. By contrast, its 
engagement with the short-lived “Yes for Children” campaign coalition (September-
November, 2012) did not contribute substantially to its advocacy effectiveness.
B  Strong National Grassroots Coordination
As mentioned earlier, CRA’s membership spans a range of service providers, 
professional bodies, human rights groups etc. Members were consulted for the 
UN Shadow Report in 2006, and are consulted during the preparation of its annual 
Report Card, which rates the government’s performance on its commitments to 
19 Compass, 2011: 21.
20  Barnardos commissioned the poll. Other NGOs in the group were CARI, Dublin Rape Crisis Centre, ISPCC, Irish 
Association of Young People in Care (renamed EPIC), One in Four and Rape Crisis Network, Ireland.
21  Irish Association of Young People in Care (renamed EPIC), One in Four and Rape Crisis Network, Ireland.Barnardos, the 
Children’s Rights Alliance, ISPCC and Campaign for Children came together in September 2012 as “Yes for Children.” 
This was not a legal entity but a loose campaigning coalition. See The Irish Times video of the launch www.youtube.com/
watch?v=IB01aqoxIEA, CRA CEO.
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children. Each member has a vote at the AGM, including voting in the Board of 
Directors. Therefore, strong national-grassroots coordination is at the heart of the 
organisation’s work. Members are kept abreast of policy developments and Dáil 
proceedings via CRA’s information sources (emailed to members and available on 
the website): a quarterly Newsletter, weekly Oireachtas Monitor, occasional Policy 
Briefings and Press Releases etc. 
During the campaign in 2012, members were provided with a host of information 
sources for use in local campaign-related activities (see Summary of Referendum 
Campaign Activities). These included: A summary explanation of amendment wording; 
Frequently asked question; Short guide to the children’s referendum; Nóta treorach 
maidir le reifreann na leanaí (Referendum note in the Irish language); Analysis of the 
children’s amendment; Note on the children’s referendum and disability etc. The 
Campaign Toolkit and a Resource section of the website were used by members to 
support the referendum and “get the vote out,” especially in the final days leading up 
to the vote. The Constitutional Working Group was formed in March 2012 in order 
to deepen engagement with and seek members’ views and ideas for the referendum 
campaign.
To further promote voter mobilisation, CRA member organisations were offered 
information leaflets, posters stickers and badges for a “Yes” vote, and members 
were encouraged to add the campaign logo to email signature, a Facebook ribbon 
and countdown clock. For example, as part of the campaign, CRA offered three 
simple ways for member organisations and others to become involved: 1. Pledge 
– your vote and encourage family and friends to do likewise; 2. Share – this email 
with your colleagues, friends and family; 3. Vote – on 10th November 2012. CRA 
media training allowed a range of different members to call for a yes vote. CRA 
also devised a “Connectors” project to spread the yes message through influential 
stakeholders and organisations. It engaged in a series of meetings, photo-calls, and 
also held briefings to explain how the referendum would impact positively on the 
specific sectors, for example, early years, legal and disability.
Therefore, one advocacy lesson emerging is that established two-way systems 
and processes for national grassroots coordination and input in representative 
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organisations expedite exchange of ideas, information flow and critical mobilisation 
mass for campaigns and thereby contribute to advocacy effectiveness.
 
C   Disciplined and focused messages and effective 
communications
The main focus of CRA’s messaging and communication’s efforts in the early 
years was in relation to policy makers – senior civil servants and politicians 
in government and to a lesser extent, the general public. CRA’s direct insider 
lobbying was enhanced by a capacity to communicate solutions, without laying 
claim to the wins publically: Some organisations are better at promoting word 
of their access and influence (EI:13). Inputs to crafting and drafting legislation 
needed to be played down rather than communicated more broadly in order to 
preserve CRA’s working relationship with government.
 
Within statutory circles, CRA is seen as a considered voice, a resource for 
those working in the area of child welfare and children’s rights. Its messages 
are thought of as respectful of the state and the barriers it faces (EI:10). 
Senior civil servants have developed a relationship of trust and mutual respect 
with senior CRA staff (CEO, Jillian van Turnhout, Legal & Policy Director, 
Maria Corbett). This has resulted in a layered understanding, identifying the 
blockages (EI:10) which was a crucial factor when drafting the appropriate 
wording for the amendment to the Irish Constitution.
CRA used an annual Report Card to communicate to a wider audience the 
Irish government’s performance against its stated commitments to children in 
a range of areas from education to poverty.22 Again, the level of collaboration 
with government in development of this advocacy tool was important. Senior 
civil servants reviewed the assessments before they were rated or released 
to the public. We did run it by the civil servants, a chapter on each area, to 
check if we got it right. They had no idea what grade we’d give (EI:7). The 
end result was subject to independent scrutiny by an external assessment 
panel. Therefore, facilitating a government preview helped to validate the 
findings and strengthen the organisation’s message on the need for reform. 
CRA has scored the government’s commitments to children’s rights as 
outlined in documents such as Social Partnership Agreement: Towards 
2016; the Programme for Government, 2007-2012; and the Ryan Report 
Implementation Plan, 2009.
 
For example, Report Card 2013 covered the following main areas – Children’s 
Constitutional Rights, Right to Education, Right to Health, Right to an 
Adequate Standard of Living, Right to Protection from Abuse and Neglect, 
and Right to Equality and Non-discrimination. CRA rated the government’s 
progress in relation to subcategories and made recommendations for 
improvement – e.g. Implementation of the Ryan Report (B- grade), Child and 
Family Agency (B-grade) and Children’s Rights Referendum (A grade). 
Not all civil servants were pleased with the Report Card system and some 
reacted negatively to being blamed for not meeting standards when they 
22   The Report Card was adapted from one used in the USA by the organisation Children Now, California,  
who were one of The Atlantic Foundation’s grantees.
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said it was their political masters pulling the strings (EI:11). Others were 
less impressed by CRA’s concentration on the referendum at the expense 
of maintaining pressure on government (via its communications’ systems) to 
provide services in support of children and vulnerable families: All my life I 
have worked for improved and efficient services... Legislation won’t make that 
happen. Implementation of the Ryan Report recommendations will. Work with 
the mainstream. Improve the services. The outside money [from foundations] 
will be gone soon. (EI:10).
To maximise the impact of the annual Report Card findings, CRA conducted 
follow-up meetings with individual politicians and with party leaders. During 
these meetings, CRA used short briefing documents that conveyed various 
political party’s stated policy positions and also offered solutions, i.e. avenues 
to be pursued for change: Here is where you can make a difference. This is 
what your policy statement is. Give it to them. Then back again to make the 
case (EI:6). 
CRA’s referendum campaign activities involved production and dissemination 
of information materials and commentary, on-going engagement with member 
organisations (messaging and media training), targeted external engagement 
(briefing with key advocacy targets), media coverage, maintaining an online 
presence, production of videos with member organisations etc. However, as part 
of joining the “Yes for Children” campaign, the organisations involved, including 
the CRA agreed to a single media contact and to only press release as “Yes 
for Children.” This policy was followed by CRA, even though at times the staff 
found it frustrating. 
During the campaign CRA participated in media interviews and debates carried in 
various traditional media outlets, produced a high number of opinion pieces and 
had a consistent presence and following in new media (Facebook and Twitter). 
For example, as of April 2013, CRA had 2,977 followers on Twitter and 4,097 
Facebook followers. The national TV and radio agenda-setting shows were 
prioritised such as “Drivetime,” “Morning Ireland,” “News at One,” and the current 
affairs TV programme, “Prime Time.” However, the degree of consensus on the 
need for a referendum meant that CRA’s communication’s work was “a hard sell.” 
Too much consensus meant that the media lost interest. A little more controversy 
could have sparked more public interest. Instead, the general feeling prevailed 
that ‘Ah, sure, it will pass.’ (EI:13)
Twenty-five member organisations received media training. Visits to the website 
spiked with 1,999 visits on 9th November 2012, the day before the referendum.  
The referendum page received 21,712 views in 2012. A set of short videos 
created with members was uploaded to the website and YouTube channels. This 
was a cost-effective way to develop clips for multiple dissemination opportunities. 
However, the Supreme Court Judgment (on the Thursday before the Saturday vote, 
with a moratorium on media reporting from 1pm on Friday) confused the public and 
the media. The Court’s finding was that the government’s information booklet on the 
referendum was unlawful. This finding had a negative impact on voter turnout. 
The key lesson emerging from the CRA’s communications’ experience was the 
benefit of having several strategies to boost the communications effort and ensure 
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messaging “hits” landed on multiple advocacy target sites: from training member 
organisations to ensure multiple voices on the issue throughout Ireland, to on-going 
updates to the website and a constant presence on social media etc., activities that 
were part of the campaign information and communication’s work that contributed 
to widespread information and awareness-raising and mobilisation (see Summary of 
Referendum Campaign Activities).  
D  Solid Research & Knowledge Base
OF supported grantees to commission or gather data to advance advocacy 
arguments. The area of children’s rights in Ireland posed a particular problem 
because of the paucity of data. Therefore, CRA’s annual Report Card was both 
a mechanism for rating performance relative to government’s commitments, but 
also a means by which to solicit data from government in response to the ratings 
given. The Alliance just kept on rating certain areas poorly until the information 
was released (EI:1). This strategy enabled CRA to produce trend data from 2009-
2012 in relation to progress in major areas affecting children’s lives like education 
and health, and thereby contribute to the knowledge base. As one policy-maker 
reported, They [CRA] have quality inputs and materials, budget submissions and 
scorecard…even if we don’t like all of it (EI:10).
Much of CRA’s advocacy work in relation to the content of the constitutional 
amendment was carried out in a confidential manner and in consultation with 
legal experts such as Geoffrey Shannon (the government’s Rapporteur on Child 
Protection). It is possible to trace the imprint of CRA’s language and submissions 
in government policy documents. This level of cooperation and collaboration 
provided a comprehensive analysis that would not have been possible otherwise. 
During formulation of the amendment wording, in addition to written submissions, 
meetings were held with the Minister’s advisors. [NGO] Advocacy was very closely 
watched…during the period …for a leak (EI:6). The irony is that while many of 
CRA’s submissions and research inputs to government were subsequently used, 
they cannot be directly attributed. Examples viewed during the evaluation, however, 
demonstrate how parts of CRA policy submissions were replicated in government 
materials. The wording does not go as far we would have liked but a satisfactory 
compromise was struck that is stronger than the option we understood was being 
considered prior to our intervention. (EI:6).
The Alliance just kept on rating  
certain areas poorly until the  
information was released.
 
In addition to its contributions to emerging legislation, CRA’s research contained in 
its submissions had a positive impact on structural changes. For example, CRA has 
advocated for a separate, senior (cabinet level) Minister for Children, and outlined 
the brief in some detail. The appointment of a dynamic Minister, committed to reform 
in 2011, brought added value to CRA’s propositions for change. A critical step 
taken by the Minister was to begin the process of establishing the Child and Family 
Agency with its own dedicated management, reporting, performance assessments, 
accountability and resources. 
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The government has actively sought CRA inputs on many occasions because its 
knowledge is respected. In many respects, CRA’s policy analysts were pragmatic 
advocates. As a senior policy-maker reported, Their submissions [to government] 
are done well, thoroughly and quickly…and they are used. That’s effect (EI:31). 
CRA provided the intellectual analysis for the politicians and the civil servants 
who often did not have the time to explore policy issues and solutions. Their 
submissions were evidence-based, substantive and were perceived as having merit. 
By continually monitoring and making public the issues for children …[CRA] has 
helped to bring children’s rights to the fore in Ireland (EI:31).
Therefore, in relation to the role of research and knowledge to advance advocacy, 
the lesson is that government is likely to avail of and apply findings when they 
address existing gaps in knowledge, are of a high quality, and where there 
is consensus among member organisations in relation to findings. This was 
evidenced by the successful uptake of some of CRA’s submissions around the 
wording for a referendum. 
E  Timely, Opportunistic Lobbying and Engagement
Throughout its years working to advance the idea of a referendum on children’s 
rights CRA sought to build relationships with civil servants in government 
departments and with representatives across political parties. Access was key. 
They had the relationships to cut the deal and get the amendment over the line 
(EI:27). CRA was perceived as having a “dream team” because of the CEO’s skill 
as a lobbyist combined with the policy analyst’s capacity to research and produce 
well-crafted submissions (often with inputs by external specialists) on complicated 
legal issue. Therefore successful insider lobbying required high quality legal and 
policy analysis, compiled in well-researched submissions, to maintain and sustain 
the advocacy relationships. These factors have been reported time and again during 
the evaluation as a major plank in the organisation’s success. CRA’s team is highly 
regarded by government and civil servants. Civil servants expect people to be on 
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the ball. Sometimes [NGOs] are right and sometimes the state is wrong. It’s a fluid 
thing. If you lose respect for one another, there’s no progress. (EI:10).
CRA’s lobbying strategy went into a different gear following the election of the 
government in 2011. The appointment of the CEO, Jillian van Turnhout, to the 
Seanad was interpreted as an advocacy success – i.e. the placement of a key 
policy player to ensure passage of the referendum. A designated Senate seat 
symbolized the importance of the issue. 
The new CEO, Tanya Ward, had a different set of relationships in government 
circles, forged during her work with ICCL. Maria Corbett, Legal and Policy 
Director, and Deputy Chief Executive, was a consistent and respected presence in 
policy processes. Therefore, CRA’s lobbying continued, with an additional well-
placed insider in the Seanad. In 2012, CRA liaised directly with the Minister’s office 
on the wording of the referendum. Written submissions went back and forth and 
influenced the referendum wording. You have to understand the difference one 
word can make – [in drafting of the amendment] shall instead of may.  
That’s absolutely major (EI:6). 
A lesson from the lobbying experience was the need to carefully read the dynamics 
of government. For example, there was reported tension between political advisors 
(who wanted change) and civil servants (charged with reducing costs in a recession 
and therefore not looking to widen their department’s obligations). This dynamic will 
become more pronounced as implications of the amendment wording are revealed 
in practice and case law. For example, bellwethers reported that civil servants in 
the Departments of Justice and Education appear less inclined to meet with NGOs. 
Therefore, further lobbying will be required to address policy bottlenecks and to 
give meaningful effect to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.
F  Collaborating Funders, strategic funding
The One Foundation (and The Atlantic Philanthropies) invested significant 
resources and supports in CRA. The investments transformed the organisation 
into a professional NGO, with a clear vision, mission and strategic plan: The 
business model brought professionalism…a concern with outcomes rather than 
activities (EI:6). The certainty of funding over a number of years imbued CRA with a 
confidence in its mission, enabled it to develop advocacy capacity and strengthened 
its hand in negotiations with government: Funding from Atlantic and One gave us 
credibility – government knew philanthropy was backing us (EI:7). It is anticipated 
that AP will continue to fund CRA to the end of its tenure in 2016.
2.3.4 Conclusion
Without the existence of the Alliance, and without the support of One, this 
amendment would simply not have happened (EI:31). The One Foundation 
supported the Children’s Rights Alliance to be its lead investment to ‘make 
children’s rights real.’ CRA advocacy has supported unquestionably the concept 
of a referendum to enshrine children’s rights in the Irish Constitution. As the 
referendum result remains subject to a High Court appeal, the process is not totally 
complete. However, many bellwethers anticipate that as a result of the amendment, 
the State must put the safety and welfare of the child at the centre of major 
decision-making in relation to child protection and in supporting struggling families. 
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Up to 2,000 children in long-term state care may be afforded the opportunity to be 
adopted and given a second chance at a stable family. The amendment provides 
that the best interest of the child must be the paramount consideration in care, 
adoption, guardianship, custody and access proceedings. It ensures that a judge 
must listen to the views of a child when making decisions in these proceedings. 
In addition, it sets a new benchmark for how Ireland views and values children 
and provides a legal framework by which the nation can improve its practices and 
policies to move beyond the stories of abuse that have emerged in recent times. 
CRA’s contribution to this success was vital and significant, work that by its very 
nature was covert, based on building close working relationships with civil servants 
in many government departments and with politicians across various parties.  
The organisation’s status as a representative body facilitated advocacy access,  
as did the quality of its policy submissions, but the organisation could not publicise 
the extent to which its submissions to government successfully translated into policy 
because to do so might jeopardise a productive working relationship and the end 
goal. While OF’s grant ends in 2013, CRA will most likely continue to be supported 
by AP, under its Children and Youth programme. This will enable CRA to continue 
its advocacy on behalf of children’s rights at least until 2016, though most likely, 
given resources available, on a smaller scale, and as a more compact organisation. 
Nonetheless, CRA can claim to have made an historic contribution to advancing the 
rights of children in Ireland. The organisation can trace multiple advocacy wins from 
2006 onwards, work conducted with OF support, that successfully propelled the 
idea of a referendum on children’s rights to the point where it became a reality.
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Making Immigrant  
Rights Real
This section opens with an overview of Ireland’s 
changed migration landscape, followed by 
a description of The One Foundation’s (OF) 
thinking on measures to effect change in 
response to a growing immigrant population,  
and the investments made to achieve its  
goal – to make immigrant rights real in Ireland.  
A case study of an investment in the Migrant 
Rights Centre Ireland (MRCI) follows to  
provide a deeper understanding of some 
advocacy approaches taken, their impact,  
and lessons learned. 
3
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3.1 Migration – Ireland
From the late twentieth to the early twenty-first centuries, Ireland (Republic) 
experienced a dramatic change in migration patterns - emigration flows reduced to 
a trickle as unprecedented numbers were drawn to Ireland because of its thriving 
economy. “The potent combination of economic growth, a property bubble, and 
a relaxed immigration regime’ led to a ‘rapid increase in the number of migrants 
moving to Ireland.”1 With the global downturn in 2008, patterns reversed again, 
and Ireland became once more a country of net emigration. While many migrants 
returned to their places of origin, a significant number had settled, and have stayed 
in Ireland.
The 2011 census showed that “non-Irish nationals” accounted for almost 12% of 
the population. In a little over a decade, Ireland, with its population of 4.5 million 
people, had gone from a largely homogeneous population to one of ethnic and 
cultural diversity. These changes occurred during OF’s limited lifetime. The table 
below provides an overview of main national groups living in ROI from 2002 to 
2011. A significant number of migrants entered from EU/EEA nations and were 
therefore entitled to work in Ireland.2  
Rank 2002 2006 2011
1. UK (101,257) UK (112,548) Poland (122,585)
2. USA (11,135) Poland (63,276) UK (112,259)
3. Nigeria (8,650) Lithuania (24,628) Lithuania (36,683)
4. Germany (7,033) Nigeria (16,300) Latvia (20,593)
5. France (6,231) Latvia (13,319) Nigeria (17,642)
6. China (5,766) USA (12,475) Romania (17,304)
7. Romania (4,910) China (11,161) India (16,986)
8. Spain (4,347) Germany (10,289) Philippines (12,791)
9. South Africa (4,113) Philippines (9,548) Germany (11,305)
10. Philippines (3,742) France (9,064) USA (11,015)
Sources: CSO, 2003 and 2012 in Gilmartin (2012:9). ROI, Republic of Ireland not including NI.
Table 1. Ireland (Republic, ROI) – Top Ten National Groups, 2002, 2006 and 2011
 
The table shows trends of relevance to the evaluation. For example, the number of 
migrants from Poland (an EU member state) almost doubled between 2006 and 
2011 (63,276 to 122,585), workers who were entitled to freedom of movement 
within the EU. Non-EU/EEA migrants, officially termed TCNs (Third Country 
Nationals) also arrived in increasing numbers. For example, the number from 
Nigeria doubled between 2002 and 2006 (8,650 to 16,300), while the number 
1  Mary Gilmartin, The changing landscape of Irish migration, 2000-2012. National Institute For Regional and Spatial 
Analysis, Working Paper Series, No. 69, October 2012. 
2  European Union (EU) member states, currently at 27. European Economic Alliance (EEA) countries are Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway. No records of entry and exit of EU nationals are retained by the Irish state and therefore 
numbers are CSO estimates.
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from the Philippines more than tripled in the period 2002-2011 (3,742 to 12,791). 
In the context of over 4.5 million people, the number of migrants entering Ireland 
was relatively small. In addition 80% of migrants to Ireland from 2006-12 had EU 
nationality, and were entitled to live and work in Ireland.3 Nevertheless, one study 
found the Irish media’s stance to be “largely negative,” focused on “issues of 
control and security” and portraying immigrants as “exploited workers or victims.”4 
Migrants whose country of origin was not EU or EEA, such as those entering from 
the Philippines, had to seek permission to enter through work or study visas,  
and their movements were “carefully monitored.”5 
Legislation to deal with the emerging situation in relation to work permits came 
into force from 2003 onwards.6 By 2009, with the economic downturn, and 
unemployment at over 14%, the government “tightened up” its work permit 
legislation, a move that had a direct impact on vulnerable migrant workers. Work 
permits could generally only be availed of for occupations with annual salaries of 
€30K, except in “exceptional” cases.7 For example, in Domestic Work and Care in 
private homes, new applicants were no longer eligible for permits. Work permits 
were issued to the employer, not the migrant, and required regular renewal for the 
migrant to remain “in status.” When granted, permits were issued for two years 
initially, then renewed for three years, by which time, the migrant could apply for 
long-term residency.
The pattern of work permit allocations reflected the reversal of migration trends  
– a decline of 8% to 7,271 recorded in 2010-2011.8 According to recent figures, 
there has been a 70% decline in the number of foreign nationals seeking work in 
Ireland since 2006.9 
Similar patterns of increase and decrease in numbers of immigrants were  
recorded for another category – refugees and asylum seekers. Asylum seekers, 
who constitute a small proportion of overall migrant flows, live in Ireland while 
their application is processed. Ireland does not have a single procedure for 
assessment of protection claims - refugee, subsidiary protection and leave to 
remain cases are decided on separately.10 In fact a small percentage of asylum 
seekers, approximately 10%, are granted asylum or leave to remain, with the overall 
refugee recognition rate for 2010 as low as 3.4%.11 During the application process 
(which can take several years), asylum seekers and refugees are accommodated 
in Direct Provision Centres (often underused hotels or hostels), and given a weekly 
allowance of €19.10 (with €9.60 per child). They have no right to work or to social 
protection. A report by the Irish Refugee Council documented serious shortcomings 
with the system and described direct provision as “State-sanctioned child poverty 
and exclusion.”12 
3  Gilmartin op cite.  
4   Helene Perold, 2010, Media, public storytelling and social justice. FOMACS Forum on Migration and 
Communications. 
5   Gilmartin op cite. Ireland’s borders are staffed by members of the Garda Siochana/Police. No record is kept of EU/EEA 
migrants, because of their right to freedom of movement within the EU. 
6  Employment Permits Acts were introduced in 2003 and 2006. In 2012, special provision was made to allow migrants 
from Romania and Bulgaria to access work permits. See www.djei/labour/workpermits.
7  Positions with an annual salary below €30k must be advertised for six days in the media and lodged with FÁS (the 
government’s national training body) for eight weeks, before a work permit is issued to a migrant worker.
8 ESRI report comissioned by the Integration Centre, 2012.
9 CSO figures reported on Morning Ireland, 1 March 2013.
10 Gilmartin, 2012.
11  Joyce, 2011 cited in the ESRI, Annual Monitoring Report on Integration, 2012 for the Intergration Centre. 
12  Irish Refugee Council, 2012, State Sanctioned Child Poverty and Exclusion: The Case of children in Accommodation for 
Asylum-seekers. Of the 5,098 residents in Direct Provision, over a third are children.
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In addition to specific pieces of legislation to address areas such as work permits, 
legislation on forced labour and trafficking was passed in 2013. The General 
Scheme of Criminal Law, the Human Trafficking (Amendment) Bill will ensure 
victims are protected and employers prosecuted. Most important, however, is the 
Immigrant Residence and Protection (IRP) Bill, which has been drafted and re-
drafted over several years. At one point, prior to a change of government in 2011, 
the IRP Bill had over 700 amendments, following consultations and submissions 
with relevant parties. The Department of Justice has pledged that the IRP Bill will 
address procedural and processing gaps and make clear and transparent the terms 
for immigration and family reunification, employment etc. The current Minister for 
Justice decided to draft a new bill, promised in 2013, a process that has been 
described as taking place very much behind closed doors…highly sensitive 
(EI:24). There is also a rise in racist incidents according to a poll conducted 
with Irish politicians (almost half of whom felt there was an increase from 2011 
to 2012).13 
Therefore, during OF’s limited lifetime, Irish society had to adapt to an 
unprecedented inflow of migrants, the vast majority of whom had every right to 
enter, live and work here. Nonetheless, government systems and social services 
were unprepared and inexperienced in dealing with this scale of inward migration. 
Legislation needed to be hastily developed in response to emerging issues. 
Ultimately, social policy responses lagged behind developments. Media coverage - 
an important indicator of how immigration is understood by the general public and 
politicians - highlighted the challenges rather than the contributions of migrants and 
their families. 
13  Millward Brown Landsdowne (MBL), 2011 and 2012 for the Integration Centre, Attitudes towards Immigration and 
Immigration Policy Among TDs. Available on The One Foundation website.
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3.1.1 Advocacy Goal and Strategy – “make immigrant rights real”
The advocacy goal identified by OF during its 2008 review was “to make immigrant 
rights real.” The other goal in the Integration programme was – “to make multi-
denominational education a real option in Ireland.” This evaluation was concerned 
with the advocacy goal, though clearly measures to ensure a diverse, non-
denominational education that could impact on the advocacy goal. The aim was to 
have “minorities integrated into Irish society so their children have the same rights 
and opportunities as others’ children.” To ensure good integration outcomes for the 
children of immigrants, OF investments needed to have an impact on legislation, 
immigration systems, and national/local policy and processes. 
Immigrant rights are protected in Ireland, as evidenced by the following: 
1. Immigrant Rights appear in legislation 
2. The immigration system is fair, transparent and accountable 
3.  Immigrants have access to information on their rights,  
entitlements and services.
3.1.2 Investments, 2005-2008 and 2009-2013
OF sought to secure long term improvements in the lives of immigrant children 
by investing in organisations already established and working with adult migrant 
populations and their families. Investments and supports were provided to support 
integration at national and local levels; to enable migrants to access their statutory 
rights and entitlements (through information and support provided via grantee 
organisations), and to encourage statutory agencies to revise their services in light 
of the needs of this new constituency. Legislative change was required for a fair and 
transparent immigration and asylum system. 
OF’s process for selecting grantees, common across all its programmes, was 
particularly challenging among immigrant rights NGOs. Certain NGOs did not 
make it through the due diligence and business planning processes central to 
OF’s venture philanthropy approach. The selection process sparked debate about 
performance within NGOs generally and the need for a focus on outcomes as well 
as activities. There were a lot of tensions. Organisations wanted cash, but found 
the model we were introducing tough – business planning was very engaged, we 
made them jump through hoops, to develop both a strategic and operational plan 
and then made them pitch it to our board. (EI:4)
Legislative change was required for a  
fair and transparent immigration and 
asylum system. 
 
Four organisations were selected for funding for 2004-2008: The Migrant Rights 
Centre Ireland (vulnerable migrant workers and their families), Integrating Ireland 
(a national network), Irish Refugee Council (asylum seekers and refugees) and The 
Irish Traveller Movement. Three other organisations were also funded: NASC, in 
Cork city, (information and legal advice), Refugee Information Service and Longford 
Women’s Link (mother and child programme for migrants in direct provision). 
These early investments were made to build organisational capacity in addition to 
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improving services and supports to migrants. The grants were to professionalise 
how they were doing their business. Get them to step up their game (EI:4).  
A major piece of research commissioned and published by OF collated all  
available data on migrants in Ireland for the first time.14 
By 2008, immigration and integration policies had not changed dramatically.  
In addition, with the economic recession, the context for advocacy work to advance 
immigrant rights had become more challenging. OF decided to support a small 
number of NGOs who were emerging leaders working with immigrants, refugees 
and asylum seekers: Migrant Rights Centre Ireland, Irish Refugee Council and The 
Integration Centre, with two city-based NGOs, NASC (Cork) and Doras Luimní 
(Limerick), as the regional/local arm to the advocacy effort. All five NGOs were 
deemed to have developed “trusted working relationships” (EI:4) with advocacy 
allies within the sector, the civil service, local authorities, politicians, equality allies 
etc. In addition, they could provide a strong evidence-base and casework to 
demonstrate the impact of legislation and immigration procedures. Grantees were 
actively supporting the Citizens Information Centres (local information centres 
operated by a mix of some paid workers and volunteers, financed by the state) via 
the provision of training and information to enable the mainstreaming of these points 
of reference/support for migrants’ rights. All five organisations were working with 
local authorities to develop and implement local Integration Plans. 
2004-2008 2009-2013
MRCI 363,000 367, 110
Irish Refugee Council 535,380 628,495








Source: OF records. OF moved LWL to its Children’s Programme in 2008-9. 
Table 2. Immigrant Rights – Grantees & Amounts, 2005-2008 and 2008-2013
 
3.2 Key Achievements – Advocacy wins and Impact 
There is no doubt that progress in relation to making immigrant rights real has been 
spasmodic at best, with the most important advances established in the early years 
14 Prospectus, 2008. Analysis of The New Communities Sector in Ireland.
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of the foundation’s work. Once the recession took hold in 2008, high unemployment 
rates and a reversal of migration patterns seriously challenged the advocacy efforts 
of grantees. Nonetheless, activities of the five NGOs have contributed to the 
following achievements in relation to each of the OF objectives identified above. 
These achievements point to gradual wins towards the main advocacy goal  
– to make immigrant rights real - in terms of legislative change, statutory  
services and supports and integration measures:
Improved Legislation 
Objective 1. Immigrant Rights appear in legislation) 
Some legislation has been enacted with increased protections (e.g. on worker 
exploitation and means of redress). The government has delivered secondary 
legislation on forced labour and trafficking, and there have been advances on 
migrant workers’ protections. An Immigration Residence and Protection Bill 
is pending and should at least provide clarity and transparency on terms and 
conditions of immigration, residence and protection measures for immigrants.
Improved Services & Supports 
Objective 2. The immigration system is fair, transparent and accountable 
There has been significant mainstreaming of information on immigrant rights. For 
example, from a base of zero in 2009, 80% of Citizen Information Centres (CICs) 
around the country should have received training on migrant issues by end 2013.15 
Improved Integration Measures 
Objective 3. Immigrants have access to information about rights, entitlements,  
and services 
There has been a marked increase in the number (and quality) of local integration 
plans, from a base of 10% in 2009 to an anticipated 88% of local authorities having 
plans by end 2013. Local authorities have also committed to on-going assessment 
of targets in the plans, as evidenced in the cities of Limerick, Waterford and Cork.16 
In addition to improvements in legislation, services and supports, and integration 
measures, grantee activities have contributed to the following factors that are 
important in terms of the sustainability of immigrant rights.
Stronger Sectoral Advocacy - There is a more coherent immigrant NGO sector 
that at the very least collaborates on certain agreed advocacy issues, campaigns 
and actions - for example, in relation to legislation on forced labour and the new 
IRP Bill.17 There is also an exchange of information on national and local strategies.  
A number of highly regarded leaders have emerged as spokespersons on immigrant 
rights. Advocacy links have been established with allies in Europe, in the US and 
in the UN, transnational advocacy connections that allow a two-way exchange of 
good practice. 
Evidence-base - There is now a substantial body of evidence on immigrant 
experiences in Ireland in employment, social services, immigration procedures 
etc. All grantees have contributed to the body of evidence according to their area 
of specialization (worker rights, asylum etc.) either through a combination of in-
house data gathering processes, and/or commissioned research. For example, 
a number of OF grantees have collated evidence and collaborated in a shared 
15 For information on Citizen Information Centres (CICs) see www.citizensinformation.ie
16 The Integration Centre, Integration Plans, Waterford, Cork and Dublin. www.integrationcentre.ie
17   NGO Coalition Briefing Paper on IRP Bill, 2010. See www.mrci.ie 
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analysis of trends to substantiate claims for change to the Department of Social 
Protection’s practices.18 
Social cohesion – While it is difficult to attribute social cohesion benefits to the 
cumulative effect of grantees’ work, their contribution alongside that of many 
organisations working to promote integration, equality and anti-racism was best 
framed in terms of what has not happened: Ireland hasn’t had the race riots that 
have happened in other countries (EI:1). As another interviewee reported, social 
cohesion is a critical consideration for future stability: If we don’t get it right, it will 
bite us later (EI:26).
Appreciation of Ireland’s permanent diversity – Despite some serious setbacks 
raised in the FOMACS report on media representations, public discourse has 
advanced at the very least in a positive direction to reflect a growing appreciation 
of diversity, an awareness of the permanence of Ireland’s multiculturalism, and an 
intolerance of racism. However, recent opinion polls highlight the need for continued 
vigilance and demonstrate how fragile the base of support is for migrant rights given 
renewed net emigration.19 
3.3 Migrant Rights Centre Ireland – Case study (www.mrci.ie)
MRCI was selected as the case study site for several reasons including its 
commitment to building immigrants’ capacity to advocate for their rights, its use of 
creative advocacy strategies and because of evidence of government “take up” of 
solutions it proposed.20 (The author worked with MRCI as Independent External 
Evaluator from 2006 to 2011).21 
3.3.1 MRCI – Background, Activities and Milestones
Established in 2001, the Migrant Rights Centre Ireland (MRCI) is a national 
organisation that seeks to promote the rights of migrant workers and their families 
in an intercultural society. In the early years, direct support and advice was provided 
to migrants via a Drop-in Centre in a city-centre basement location, operated by two 
Catholic nuns with funding provided by the Columban Fathers. Following receipt 
of OF’s first investment in 2005/6, MRCI moved to a more substantial, city-centre 
office base, and completed a strategic planning process. Throughout the years 
MRCI has combined the provision of information and advice with advocacy work 
conducted at local, national and transnational levels.
MRCI’s founders and board members have a shared social analysis, informed 
by experiences of working on issues of ethnic and racial diversity in Ireland and 
abroad. The organisation’s former Chair, Bobby Gilmore (a Columban priest), has 
a global perspective informed by experiences working in the Philippines and in the 
UK.22 Another board member, Anastacia Crickley, has also worked with the Irish 
abroad, and is a long time advocate for Irish Traveller rights. She has held or holds 
positions on European and UN equality, rights and anti-racism committees. The 
18   Crosscare, Doras Luimní and NASC, 2012. Person or Number? Barriers Facing Migrants Accessing Social 
Protection.  
19  MBL polls, 2011 and 2012 commissioned by The One Foundation. See www.onefoundation.ie 
20 The term migrant is used to describe both emigrant and immigrant mobility in a globalised world.
21 Quarterly visits and reports were completed as part of this formative evaluation process. See www.ocainternational.com
22  Fr. Bobby Gilmore spearheded a campaign to release the “Birmingham Six,” Irish migrants wrongly accused of terrorist 
activities. See www.mrci.ie/about-us/our-board/
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organisation’s Director, Siobhán O’Donoghue, shares this history of community 
work with Travellers in Ireland. She worked with the Community Workers Co-
operative and represented the community sector in national policy making fora 
in 1990s. Their commitment to community development as a route to mobilising 
migrants to become their own advocates was a factor that contributed to the 
organisation’s effectiveness and imbued its processes and practices: We look at 
people as agents of their own destinies rather than as objects of our need and we 
try always to meet the hope in migrants’ eyes (Bobby Gilmore, 2011).
Community work is described as a process that is all about grassroots engagement 
(EI:23). In MRCI’s case, the aim is to ensure the participation of migrants in the 
work of the organisation at all levels. It also facilitates migrants to take an analytic 
journey - to move beyond a focus on individual needs and concerns to a focus on 
conditions affecting all migrants - thereby enhancing their understanding of social 
processes and spurring collective action for change to benefit all: “the creation 
of conditions for the critical participation of migrant workers in the work of MRCI 
and in society in general.” In practice, this has translated into activities to create 
collective spaces that build participation and empowerment (via Campaign Action 
Groups and a Migrant Forum), and facilitate opportunities for collective action for 
change (via campaigns and advocacy efforts). 
We look at people as agents of their 
own destinies rather than as objects 
of our need and we try always to meet 
the hope in migrants’ eyes. 
(Bobby Gilmore, 2011) 
 
From 2009 onwards, MRCI sharpened its strategic focus by concentrating its 
work on advocacy, community work and leadership. It refined a Case Management 
System (CMS) as the main evidence-based data source for the organisation. 
Findings were used to inform lobbying and campaign activities, media releases 
and policy papers. MRCI facilitated the most vulnerable migrant workers to 
organise and build collective capacity in labour sites such as agriculture (Mushroom 
Workers), and private homes (Domestic Workers). Leaders from these groups were 
supported via special training programmes and processes to become the backbone 
of MRCI’s public campaigns and lobbying activities. 
3.3.2 Key Achievements – MRCI
Migrant Worker Activism – MRCI developed a strong, grassroots base of 
thousands of worker activists that continues to mobilise on issues of concern. 
MRCI produced the first comprehensive resource guide to support community work 
with migrant workers in Ireland. Migrant Leaders graduated (25) from a Community 
Work diploma programme developed by MRCI in partnership with a university 
(NUI Maynooth).
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Information, referrals and training – MRCI provided quality information and 
referrals to over 5,000 migrants and their families annually, and training to 
community groups, NGOs, Trade Unions, state agencies, An Garda Siochána 
(Police), Citizen Information Centres etc., on the critical issues facing migrant 
workers and their families. 
Public Awareness Raising – MRCI maintained a high profile in the media, and used 
creative approaches (e.g. quilt exhibition and audio record of exploitation in a private 
home) to bring the experience of migrants into the public domain, consistently 
highlighting practical recommendations for change and emphasising the shared 
experience of vulnerable (undocumented) or exploited Irish migrants abroad
Bridging Visa – Successfully campaigned for a Bridging Visa scheme to regularise 
migrant workers who became undocumented through no fault of their own. 
Work Permit Scheme – Successfully campaigned for reversal of 2009 changes in 
employment permit policy that would have forced thousands of migrant workers and 
their families to leave Ireland, or become undocumented. 
Residency Protection – Successfully campaigned to allow work permit holders 
with 5 work permits to access secure residency without need for further work 
permits, while awaiting outcomes of long-term residency application. 
Over €2 million in legal judgments and awards – MRCI assisted hundreds of 
exploited workers to achieve settlements and judgments for back pay and other 
violations of employment rights. 
Improved conditions for vulnerable workers – With the trade union SIPTU, 
highlighted exploitation of workers in mushroom-growing industry, organized 
workers and established a Registered Employment Agreement to improve pay 
and conditions. With ICTU, lobbied for a government Code of Practice to protect 
domestic workers’ rights and outline employer obligations (ongoing).
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3.3.3 Advocacy Effectiveness 
The diagram below lists key milestones and advocacy approaches used by MRCI. 
Labour law & practices, 
immigration legislation
Impact
Improved Migrant Worker 
Advocacy Capacity
Migrant Rights Centre Ireland (MRCI) 2005 - 2013 Key Milestones
2006 – Harvesting Justice – Mushroom Workers Report; Improved inspections;  
2009 –  Bridging Visa, adopted by government, thousand of migrants benefit;  
Campaigns - Forced Labour, Diplomatic Immunity; 
2009 –  Tools for Change; 
2010 – Campaigns - Justice for Undocumented, Educational Access; 
2011 – Mobilising for Social Justice Published;  
2013 – Forced Labour legislation introduced.
1. Migrant Advocacy Capacity: 
Action Groups, Migrant Forum, 
Leadership Training etc. 
2. Data: MWs issues (CMS data, Case 
Work, DIC, Action Groups, Research)  
& interpretation (Policy G & Board)
Allies: (Trade Union, Community, equality, 
social justice momentum for change)
3. Campaigns/Lobbying 
- Migrants & Allies – public 
- MRCI leaders – private
4. Comms Strategy:  










According to several bellwethers interviewed for the evaluation, MRCI has been 
ranked as one of the leading advocacy organisations in Ireland. One bellwether 
described their advocacy in these terms: MRCI are one of the best NGOs to blend 
approaches to advocacy, though they don’t admit it. They promote themselves 
as being totally committed to the community development approach, but did not 
always use it. Instead, they used the preferred backroom approach – the leaders 
meeting the politicians – and the campaign approach, and the protest approach. 
They adjusted as necessary. This shows real advocacy maturity. (EI:24)
The organisation has applied a number of advocacy approaches tailored to respond 
to shifting economic and political sands. The following discussion considers MRCI’s 
advocacy effectiveness using Quinn-Patton’s criteria, and provides examples of 
lessons learned.
MRCI are one of the best NGOs to blend approaches to advocacy, though 
they don’t admit it. They promote themselves as being totally committed to the 
community development approach, but did not always use it. Instead, they used 
the preferred backroom approach – the leaders meeting the politicians – and the 
campaign approach, and the protest approach. They adjusted as necessary. This 
shows real advocacy maturity.
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A  Strong high capacity coalitions
In research commissioned by OF in 2009, Wilson Hartnell noted that large-scale 
immigration was a recent phenomenon in Irish society, and as a result, young 
NGOs had limited capacity. The first step was to build organisations. In MRCI’s 
case, this work took place in 2005-08.23 
Alongside this work, The Atlantic Philanthropies and OF combined efforts to spur 
a sectoral coalition met with some resistance. Questions about the legitimacy of 
migrant-led or Irish-led organisations and different approaches were issues that 
caused no small amount of friction and distracted from the work at hand (EI:23). 
These factors challenged efforts at coalition-building. 
For MRCI, a first step in building a strong coalition was to bring migrants from 
different places of origin together as workplace allies. For example, mushroom 
workers came from several Eastern European countries where the only common link 
besides work was the Russian language. Members of the Domestic Workers Group 
were from the Philippines, Africa and South East Asia. Facilitating a movement from 
a concern with individual needs to an analysis of the collective position took time. 
Within three years, several groups of the most vulnerable workers were in place 
and were being supported to build their capacity: a Mushroom Workers’ Group 
(later re-named Agricultural Workers Action Group), a Domestic Workers’ Action 
Group, Forced Labour Action Group and a Migrant Forum. 
While building connections between migrant worker groups, MRCI strategically 
targeted links with the Trade Union movement, considered a natural ally. For 
example, from 2006, one of the mushroom workers was appointed as a full-time 
SIPTU organiser in the Cavan-Monaghan area. A SIPTU representative attended 
Sunday meetings of the Domestic Workers Group (to sign up members, collect 
dues etc.), and SIPTU continues to collaborate on shared campaigns. Migrant 
worker issues were placed on the agenda of the annual conferences of the national 
trade union body, ICTU. At one point a national Trade Union leader described MRCI 
as “the conscience of the Trade Union movement.” By 2012, Bill Abom, MRCI’s 
Deputy Director left to become a full-time trade unionist, further solidifying the 
organisation’s work with the movement. 
Illustrating the growing trend towards transnational migration advocacy and 
activism, MRCI aligned itself with European and International immigrant advocacy 
bodies and rights-based fora (e.g. PICUM undocumented, European Network 
against Racism OSCE, Anti Slavery International, ITUC, International Domestic 
Workers Association, ILO), including the USA (e.g. America’s Voice, ROC, 
Restaurant Opportunities Centre, Caring Across Generations, Rutgers University 
in New Jersey). These global coalitions informed MRCI’s advocacy strategies and 
provided examples of existing legislation in other jurisdictions with longer histories 
of immigration. They also provided information on additional points of future 
leverage for change in Ireland via EU Directives and UN human rights instruments. 
In 2013, MRCI collaborated with the Boston-based (Irish government supported) 
Irish International Immigration Center in a joint effort to promote the regularisation 
of undocumented immigrants in Ireland and in the USA. Therefore, MRCI’s values 
informed activities to solidify coalitions with like-minded national and transnational 
allies and advanced the organisation’s advocacy capacity. In that sense, the 
23 Building a Strong Foundation, 2008. External Evaluation, O’Carroll Associates.
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organisation used multiple points of advocacy influence. As the context changed with the 
recession, and restrictive measures were announced on work permits, Trade Union and 
equality allies were called upon to support lobbying activities. 
While MRCI mobilised organisations with strong community development, equality 
and rights-based goals to engage in public actions, campaigns and lobbying, it was 
sometimes perceived as less inclined to build an immigrant sector coalition. MRCI 
recognised this and made a concerted effort from 2010 onwards to work with broadly 
aligned organisations on specific campaigns in pursuit of shared advocacy outcomes 
– e.g. forced labour. For example, MRCI, ICI and IRC all sat on the consultative forum 
for the government’s anti-human trafficking unit and worked successfully to develop 
campaign plans for legislative change on sex trafficking and trafficking for forced labour. 
Legislation in this area was successfully passed in early 2013, confirming potential 
benefits of sectoral collaboration.
The main lesson here was while strategic alliances with movements with a shared social 
analysis can be important to advocacy efforts, they should not be developed at the 
expense of sectoral alliances. Recent success on anti-trafficking legislation demonstrates 
that policy-makers responded positively to a strong, high capacity immigrant coalition 
(MRCI, ICI and IRC). Otherwise policy-makers may perceive the sector as deeply 
divided because they can’t agree (EI:27) and discount proffered solutions for change. 
B  Strong national grassroots coordination
In MRCI’s case, advocacy was driven by the flow of information to and from migrant 
workers, their families and migrant worker groups. Issues emerging were documented 
via the database (CMS) and became the basis of casework, campaigns, policy papers 
and lobbying. 
For example, in the early years of OF investment, MRCI”s work to establish a 
Mushroom Workers Support Group (MWSG) brought the issue of exploitation 
within the industry to national prominence via its report, “Harvesting Justice” 
(November, 2006). In the space of one year, the Support Group expanded its 
membership and activities across counties Monaghan, Cavan and beyond. With 
MRCI’s support, the group employed a full-time development worker, a former 
mushroom worker, and a part-time co-ordinator. MWSG established contact 
with over 450 migrant workers in the region and supported a Core Group of 18 
emerging leaders via a training programme in group development, social analysis, 
English language tutoring, and Strategic Planning to develop into an independent 
representative organisation – the Agricultural Workers Association Ltd. (established 
2007). Project impact was reported on several levels: improvements in the lives of 
individual workers (terms and conditions of employment, increased connections with 
the community etc.), development of a worker-led group, and greater inspection and 
compliance within the industry.
Similarly, MRCI established the Domestic Workers Action Group in 2004, following 
a study of 20 domestic workers (“Private Homes: A Public Concern”), often 
vulnerable and isolated migrant women working as nannies, housekeepers and 
elderly caregivers in private homes. Members were supported to attend regular 
Sunday meetings in Dublin, and receive information on rights and entitlements. 
Their call for a legally binding set of standards for regulating domestic service 
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resulted in a code of practice, negotiated with government and promoted by 
Trade Unions. By 2012, the group had over 250 members with a core group 
actively involved in campaigns, media work and lobbying. The Trade Union 
movement is the group’s key advocacy ally – all are individual members of 
SIPTU. 
The key lesson here is that a national organisation’s efforts to build and 
support collective advocacy capacity can take place at local or national levels, 
depending on what is suitable, but must be coordinated. Attention to national 
grassroots coordination ensures advocacy is informed by the experience on 
the ground and can result in the mobilisation of advocates and allies around 
campaigns.  
 
C   Disciplined and focused messages with effective 
communications
In MRCI’s case, effective external communications were related to the 
quality of its internal communication systems – the flow of data from its case 
management database and from the various migrant groups (all sources of live 
issues and trends). MRCI substantiated its arguments for change by drawing 
on credible, evidence-based data on issues affecting migrant workers. 
In addition, the organisation identified the need to communicate MRCI’s 
distinctive focus and community work approach and enable the participation 
of migrant workers in communications activities. MRCI used a range of 
creative activities to communicate messages of exploitation and the need 
for reform, from the Domestic Workers Action Group drama “Acting Out for 
Hope and Change,” to the Restaurant Workers Action Group flash mob (at the 
Restaurant Association of Ireland’s Annual Ball). 
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With the recession, MRCI organized a conference to communicate what 
was happening in Ireland in a global context. Entitled “Fair Play: Are fair 
and decent working conditions for migrant workers possible in a changing 
labour market?,” the conference (2009) hosted a number of internationally 
renowned speakers on the issue of globalisation and the labour market.24 
Invited representatives of enterprise, National Employment Rights Authority, 
Ethical Trade Initiative, UK, for example, attended. The conference received 
considerable media coverage and MCRI logged media hits and cross-
referenced data with its media database to identify journalists active in the area 
and advocacy targets. The work of a Communications’ Officer was crucial in 
analysing and improving the organisation’s communication’s systems.
The conference solidified relationships with trade unions and the Department 
of Trade Employment and Enterprise. At the conference the Department 
announced its intention to make changes to the work permit system in light 
of the unfolding economic recession. Allies with a stake in employment and 
work permits backed MRCI’s call to hold changes to the work permits. SIPTU 
released a joint press release - It took that relationship to a whole new level, 
and IBEC [the employers’ national body], initiated real talks with us (EI:23). 
The activity showed the value of facilitating fora where the connection between 
local issues and global processes can be debated and informed by practices 
elsewhere, specifically in countries with longer histories of immigration, and 
confirmed the benefit of including all interested parties in the debate, including 
employers. The permit changes were subsequently introduced and then 
reversed as a result of national campaign led by MRCI.
A key strength of MRCI’s leadership has been its ability to conduct nuanced 
readings of the policy context to determine what is feasible politically, and 
based on this, identify points of pressure and apply appropriate advocacy 
tools. For example, MRCI used a playful, positive protest at the start of a new 
Dáil session in 2011 to advance its campaign message on the need for work 
permit reform. As members of the new government approached the gates 
of Leinster House they were met by members of the Restaurant Workers 
Action Group dressed in white chef uniforms, bearing croissants and coffee. 
It resulted in widespread media coverage and raised awareness among 
new politicians and the public regarding work permit reform. Images of the 
Taoiseach smiling in the midst of the campaigners were carried in print and 
electronic media. 
Central to all messaging and communications’ efforts was the work of 
a Communication’s Officer who issued press releases, tracked media 
(traditional and social), produced daily summaries of news on migrant issues, 
produced publications on specific issues and campaigns and analysed 
trends that were discussed at Policy Group and Board meetings. However, 
with MRCI’s budgetary cutbacks in 2011, the position of Communication’s 
Officer could no longer be sustained. Nonetheless the communications and 
messaging work to bolster advocacy continued, as demonstrated by the 
January 2013 launch of a film with SIPTU, “Food for Thought,” highlighting 
poor working conditions of 120 migrant restaurant workers, and the 
production of a simple guide to the changes in the employment permit system 
in April 2013. Throughout the OF’s investment period MRCI’s Director and 
24 Speakers included Paul Mason, BBC Economics Editor and Professor Janice Fine, Rutgers University, USA
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(former) Board Chair frequently appeared on national news media, often 
reminding audiences of the link between migrant workers’ issues in Ireland 
and the experiences of Irish emigrants abroad. 
In addition to a strong media presence and dedicated Communications 
Officer to coordinate multiple communications outputs for different advocacy 
targets, the MRCI case illustrates several advocacy nuggets: the importance 
of foregrounding migrants’ experience and migrant messengers (to provide 
evidence of the impact of policies); the benefits of organising creative, 
dramatic activities in public spaces to deliver campaign messages; 
and, in recessionary times, the value of working with allies to develop 
communications products. 
D  Solid research and knowledge base
It took MRCI several years to design and develop a suitable and appropriate system 
to document information on migrant workers’ lives from multiple sources: Drop-
In Centre, Case Work, the various migrant worker groups, and the outcomes of 
referrals to other organisations. On-going analysis of quantitative and qualitative 
findings, conducted at the Policy Group and Board meetings, informed the direction 
of campaigns. By 2011, MRCI could demonstrate that it was providing information 
and referrals to over 5,000 migrants and their families annually. 
Drawing on case work data, MRCI developed and progressed several successful 
legal cases involving workplace exploitation (with the assistance of a part-time 
barrister) that were heard at the Labour Court. In total, MRCI estimates that it has 
helped several hundred migrant workers to achieve settlements and judgments 
for back pay and for violations of their employment rights (of over €2 million). The 
organisation’s documentation of cases of exploitation was sufficiently credible for a 
government agency, the National Employment Rights Authority (NERA) to conduct 
follow-up investigations in certain industries and for Trade Unions to become 
active in organising workers. MRCI also demonstrated cases where migrant 
workers became undocumented through no fault of their own, in instances where 
the employer had failed to renew a work permit, to advance its claims for reform. 
The campaign was driven by data (EI:1), and provided a solution – a Bridging 
Visa. The list below provides examples of research commissioned or conducted 
in collaboration with other parties.
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MRCI’s Research (Sample), 2004-2012
 
2006 
CRA submits Shadow Report to UN, based on input from member organisations, 
and presents case for a referendum: From Rhetoric to Rights, Second Shadow 
Report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Children’s Rights  
Alliance, 2006.
2004 
Private Home: Public Concern (20 migrant workers); Social Protection Denied 
(impact of the Habitual Residence Condition).
2006 
Harvesting Justice: Mushroom Workers Call for Change (workers Cavan/
Monaghan); Realising Integration: Migrant Workers Undertaking Essential Low  
Paid Work in Dublin City.
2007 
Life in the Shadows: An Exploration of Irregular Migration in Ireland;
2008 
Exploitation in Ireland’s Restaurant Industry; Enabling Equality; Tools for Change: A 
Resource for Community Work with Migrant Workers and their Families in Ireland
2009 
Challenging Myths and Misinformation on Migrant Worker (jointly with NCCRI)
2010 
Trafficking for Forced Labour; 
2011 
A Framework for Tackling Forced Labour (with ICTU); Mobilising for Social Justice; 
Overcoming Barriers for Equality for Children of Non-EU Migrants.
2012 
Who Cares?: The Experience of Migrant Care Workers.
 
Note: See www.mrci.ie for complete listing and information on policy papers 
and submissions.
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MRCI submissions to government (e.g. IRP Bill, Regularisation of Undocumented, 
Work Permits etc.) formed the basis for policy briefing papers. For example, the 
‘Overcoming Barriers’ research informed its submission to the Oireachtas Joint 
Committee on Education and Social Protection in 2012 on conditions pertaining 
to children of non-EU parents charged foreign student fees to access third level 
education.25 Research was sometimes conducted with academic partners - a 
strategy that gave further substance to the claims for change and contributed 
to outcomes. For example, No Way Forward: No Going Back first researched 
the problem of trafficking for forced labour and was prepared with Dublin City 
University. More recent submissions to government used a rights-based framework 
to argue for Ireland’s compliance with international instruments such as the 
Implementation of the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 2011.
The main lesson was the value in combining in-house data and analysis (from 
workers’ exploitation to unequal education access for migrants’ children) with 
research from other sources to substantiate claims for change. They [MRCI] put 
faces to the hardships [suffered by migrant workers] and at the same time they 
delivered the reports to show the stats…the hard facts (EI:25). 
E  Timely, opportunistic lobbying and engagement 
MRCI’s lobbying strategy evolved during 2005-12 as it came to understand points 
of leverage and advocacy targets. It assessed lobbying strategies, discussed 
progress with allies, identified points of give and policy bottlenecks. It prepared 
information for briefings with politicians and civil servants who had limited 
experience initially of immigration, and brought migrants to meet policy makers.
However, the experience of lobbying Irish civil servants varied by government 
department or agency, and individual. Civil servants have learned to adapt to the 
growing demand for engagement with civil society. There’s been an evolution in 
thinking within government departments and civil servants, a total contrast to 
how it was perceived … when you didn’t get to speak with civil servants (EI:26). 
However, civil servants offered an opportunity and a challenge to MRCI’s advocacy 
efforts. Since migrant worker issues concern both the Depts of Justice (concerned 
with matters of security) and Enterprise Trade and Employment (concerned with 
business, employment etc.), MRCI needed to be in touch with the civil servants 
and politicians in both of these. In theory, NGOs who are professional and provide 
credible evidence of the need for change should find civil servants willing to 
engage. Officials in Enterprise and Employment proved more engaging because 
the change sought (e.g. improved inspections of employment sites), was mutually 
beneficial. These officials also received delegations of migrant workers. MRCI 
built strong relationships with NERA (National Employment Rights Authority), 
who investigated MRCI claims of worker exploitation. However, MRCI had limited 
success lobbying the department with most power on immigration matters, the 
Department of Justice, though other migrant organisations reported otherwise.  
An immigration policy bellwether interviewed reported that the Dept of Justice was 
notorious for its heavy handedness. They were a law onto themselves (EI:25).
25   See Migrant Education Access, mrci.ie/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Access-to-education-Briefing-Note 
pdf 
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In the early years of support from OF, MRCI successfully lobbied for two pieces of 
legislative reform: the Bridging Visa (2007 campaign), and the Work Permit Reform 
(2009 campaign). The Bridging Visa was an innovative scheme that has influenced 
strategies elsewhere, including the USA.26 MRCI’s lobbying message was simply 
that migrants through no fault of their own had fallen out of status. In lobbying 
politicians the strategy was to turn the spotlight onto rogue employers who profited 
from migrant labour and yet failed to honour their obligations. This convinced 
politicians and found favour with the public. The campaign not only called for 
change, but offered a solution. During the recession, MRCI successfully lobbied to 
reverse the policy of changes to employment permits (2009), arguing the proposed 
changes would force migrants to leave or become undocumented. 
While MRCI had positive working relationships with state agencies such as NERA 
and the Garda National Immigration Bureau, it caused controversy with a 2010 
publication: “Hidden Messages: Overt Agendas”.27 This was perceived as highly 
critical of government and civil servants because it exposed the gap between 
political rhetoric and harsh policies on migrant rights. Since MRCI had paid for 
the report with EU funds administered through a government agency, government 
sought return of the funds because, in its view, the research was not included 
in the original proposal. The perception was that the incident was an “ill-judged” 
policy tactic.
Despite MRCI’s mixed record of lobbying State actors, it bolstered its national 
advocacy by lobbying abroad. It participated in PICUM (an international 
undocumented migrants’ body) whose strategy informed its Irish work. Board 
members participated in national and European fora, where emerging practices 
were debated on EU labour, asylum, Community Strategy Directives, economic 
migrants etc. This concern with national and EU policy processes provided 
horizontal and vertical advocacy routes and points of influence. They [MRCI] now 
have a seat at the UN [Stacia Crickley]. That’s influence! (EI:24). While this UN 
appointment has nothing directly to do with MRCI, the perception, reflected in the 
quote, is that the organisation has attained this point of advocacy access, albeit via 
one of its board members.
MRCI also brought pressure on Trade Unions to leverage political capital with the 
Labour Party, and engaged in direct contact with political leaders. There is no doubt 
that MRCI also “worked the back rooms.” As one policy observer reported:  
They’re probably best at lobbying. I think it shows they are more than just 
community development. They lobbied hard and well behind closed doors.  
They used the trade unions… pushed Labour and Sinn Féin” (EI:24). 
Therefore, MRCI conducted insider and outsider lobbying, ensured migrants 
attended meetings with politicians and government officials, learned from negative 
experiences, identified policy bottlenecks, re-grouped and changed tack when 
necessary. In addition, they used links with EU fora to leverage change in Ireland. 
Its lobbying was particularly successful in its early years of support from OF and 
less so in the recession. 
26 Frank Sharry, National Immigration Forum, Washington, D.C. 
27  Niall Crowley, the report’s author, resigned as CEO of the government’s Equality Authority in 2008, in protest at the 
government’s decision to cut the Authority’s budget by 43% . 
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In 2012, MRCI learned a lesson about the limitations of its advocacy, under current 
law, to counter injustice where the migrant is undocumented. The High Court 
Judgment in the case of Amjad Hussein v The Labour Court (2012) overturned an 
earlier Labour Court advocacy win because the claimant was undocumented.28  
The High Court found that the Work Permit Act of 2003 prevented an 
undocumented worker from securing redress under labour law.
F  Collaborating funders engaged in strategic funding
OF collaborated with The Atlantic Philanthropies on a joint funding strategy to 
advance immigrant rights in Ireland. The strategy was to carve up the turf according 
to specialist areas (EI:4) and assign grants accordingly - asylum seekers (Irish 
Refugee Council), trafficking and citizenship (Immigrant Council of Ireland) work 
permits and the undocumented (MRCI), with Doras Luimní and NASC working 
on all three areas regionally. OF supported all but one of these organisations, ICI. 
The joint funding strategy provided multi-annual, core support to enable a strategic 
response on legislative change and integration of migrants. Both foundations had 
a shared target of a reformed IRP Bill (still forthcoming, ten years later, in 2013) to 
bring clarity to immigration policy. It was assumed that grantees would collaborate 
on campaigns of common interest. In the early years, this did not happen to the 
extent anticipated. 
Both foundations assessed performance and effectiveness in different ways. 
For example, AP relied on the on-going learning from a formative evaluation 
process, whereas OF used the Balanced Scorecard to discuss progress and 
measure performance. [AP] is a lot more hands off…active but not directive. 
The [organisation’s] leaders own decisions and progress is informed by the 
learning emerging from evaluation (EI:24). By comparison, several grantees 
reported difficulty applying the Balanced Scorecard system promoted by OF,  
and used for quarterly reviews. As a grantee reported: The scorecard system  
was daft and totally open to abuse. If you had any sense at all, you’d make  
sure not to set the targets too high. To be honest, we gave up on it (EI:23). 
MRCI has reported on the benefits of regular contact with OF team members, 
board participation and in particular special grants provided at important times. 
For example, OF funded MRCI’s 10th anniversary film which was screened at an 
event attended by President Mary McAleese in October 2011.29 When OF awarded 
MRCI’s Director, Siobhán O’Donoghue the Captain Cathal Ryan Award for Social 
Innovation (a scholarship of €25,000 in 2011), it was interpreted by one bellwether 
as An endorsement of her boldness in taking on all quarters (EI:27) - a direct 
reference to her advocacy leadership. 
The key lesson learned by MRCI was that contact with the two foundations afforded 
the assurance of strategic allies and committed resources to advance its advocacy 
strategy over a number of years, key factors when challenging government.  
In addition, OF management and governance requirements improved the  
capacity of the organisation. 
 
 
28 “Award to migrant quashed over illegal job status.” Irish Times, September 1, 2012. www.irishtimes.com.
29  MRCI’s 10th anniversary film provides an insight into the organisation’s approach and work with migrant workers  
and their families in Ireland: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ugEQgo_ORw&feature.
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3.3.4 Conclusion 
OF’s support of MRCI’s work enabled the organisation to successfully advance 
immigrant rights in a number of important areas directly related to the advocacy 
goal – to make immigrants rights real. MRCI developed a proven track record of 
influencing policy to advance the rights of the most vulnerable migrant workers and 
their families in Ireland. The organisation demonstrated the benefits of a community 
work approach to mobilising migrants to be active advocates in campaigns and 
media work (ensuring long term advocacy capacity on migrant rights), while also 
working the “back rooms” to leverage political capital for change, using a strong 
evidence-base to substantiate proposals. In addition to activities conducted in 
Ireland, MRCI built vertical advocacy routes via EU fora, with allies in the USA,  
and latterly at the level of the United Nations. 
Achievements include reforms in secondary legislation (“bridging visa”), labour law 
(criminalisation of forced labour), and State practices (inspections), solidifying the 
link between migrant workers and the trade union movement (ensuring long term 
support), and raising awareness of the benefits of Ireland’s new inter-cultural 
society. Factors that contributed to advocacy effectiveness included: strong 
leadership capable of providing a nuanced read of the context; strategic alliances; 
a shared social analysis and a community work approach to organising and 
mobilising; migrants’ active involvement in campaigns, lobbying, and media work; 
a strong evidence-base, and high quality (and creative) communication products. 
The re-emergence of emigration after 2008, linked to a sharp rise in unemployment 
to over 14% of the labour force, challenged MRCI’s advocacy because the 
climate of opinion towards migrants changed significantly. However, the passage 
of the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) (Amendment) Bill in 2013, following a 
campaign MRCI conducted with broadly aligned organisations, demonstrates 
what is possible, even in challenging times. New legislation promised in 2013 
(Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill) may bring clarity and transparency 
regarding immigration rights, although some campaigners expressed concerns 
the legislation may be restrictive rather than innovative.
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Building political will 
on Mental Health
This section opens with a description of the 
mental health social policy context and what 
OF sought to achieve. Analysis of advocacy 
performance and impact follows in a blended 
case study of three organisations: Amnesty 
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4.1 Mental Health, Ireland 
When OF became active in the field of mental health in 2006, quality services 
were unevenly available for those who needed them, including children, young 
people and their families. With no comprehensive national information on mental 
health problems, OF estimated from available data that one in four of all people in 
Ireland were affected by mental ill health either directly or through a family member. 
Depression accounted for almost 70% of mental health illness and for almost 50% 
of hospital admissions relating to mental health. Recorded suicide (one of few 
mental health indicators tracked), had doubled in 30 years, and was reported to be 
the biggest killer of young men aged 15-24. In 2004 alone, there were 400 deaths 
by suicide.1 Children’s mental health services lacked dedicated staff and waiting 
lists were long. For example, the Health Services Executive’s 2007 review (the main 
agency responsible) found 3,598 children waiting for assessments, 1,000 of whom 
had been waiting more than a year.2 
This assessment was substantiated by findings of the Inspector of Mental Health 
Services (2006) that mental health provision was ad hoc, with deficiencies in 
community mental health teams.3 Successive governments had failed to develop 
community-based services, which resulted in over-reliance on in-patient units.  
Also, children continued to be treated (inappropriately) in adult facilities.
Poor and inadequate services and treatments were the result of many factors, not 
least a decline in the proportion of the state health budget specifically designated 
for mental health – from 9.1% in 19984 to 7.7% in 2008.5 Responsibility for 
development of health policy, including mental health lay with the Department of 
Health, with the HSE (Health Services Executive) the main agency responsible for 
service delivery.
In 2006, the Irish government published what was seen as a progressive policy, 
“A Vision For Change” (AVFC). However, the policy had not been implemented or 
funded. AVFC called for a shift from the (hidden) treatment within Ireland’s Victorian 
institutions of containment to provision of supports in an open community setting, 
with an emphasis on recovery.
At the time, Amnesty was advocating for reform. It had identified mental health as an 
area of Irish social policy where its human rights approach could give added value 
because mental health was, it concluded, a neglected policy area,6 with ‘serious 
and multiple infringements of human rights.’7 From 2003 onwards, Amnesty had 
pioneered public information campaigns framed around the right to mental health.8 
1  This overview draws on data contained in The One Foundation’s internal documents used during TOC analysis and 
Amnesty International Ireland’s submissions to the foundation.
2  Written reply to parliamentary question, 19 October 2007, Jan O’Sullivan TD, referenced inter alia at http://debates.
oireachtas.ie/dail/2008/04/17/00019.asp.
3 Mental Health Commission, Annual Report 2006, including Report of Inspector of Mental Health Services.
4 A Vision for Change p.260
5   See WHO (2008) Policies and Practces for Mental Health in Europe: Meeting the Challenges. www.euro.who.int/-data/
assets/pdf 
6  Mental Illness: The Neglected Quarter, 2003, AII. 
7  Cooke & Montogomery, 2009. 
8   The overall aim was to make real Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that 
every person has the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 
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4.1.1 Advocacy Goal & Strategy – “build political will on mental health” 
In 2008, OF named its mental health advocacy goal “to build political will on mental 
health.” The root problem it identified was that “people with mental health problems 
in Ireland are subject to significant stigma and lack appropriate, accessible and 
effective services and supports.” Some barriers to change were easy to identify. 
There was a poorly organised mental health lobby with limited effective campaigning 
history. Significant social stigma was attached to mental health. These factors 
contributed to a perceived lack of political will to designate State resources to 
address reform. Within the State’s vast public health system, mental health was 
relatively neglected, and mental health services perceived as beholden to special 
interests with large political capital (e.g. drug and insurance companies). With an 
agreed reform policy, One Foundation decided to support organisations working to 
ensure implementation and resourcing of AVFC.
 
Given this analysis, the strategy for change identified in 2005 (during OF’s 
work with McKinsey) required three levers, working together: one to address 
the campaign, lobbying and evidence deficit; a second to “support an innovative 
project  in a selected region to help it become a centre of excellence;” and a third 
was to “support mental health NGOs, service users and their families to become 
public advocates.”
The assumption was that all three levers working in synergy would build political 
will on mental health and thereby change statutory provision to a community-based 
recovery model, and ultimately ensure a statutory right, enshrined in legislation, 
to timely and effective mental health supports. Therefore, to achieve its advocacy 
goal, OF “sought to increase political will on mental health” (as measured by 
the frequency and content of Oireachtas debates, and via political polling), and 
crucially, “realise the adoption of a proven solution” as a national programme 
(funded by the state). The evaluation uses these indicators in its discussion of 
performance and impact. 
4.1.2 Investments
Strategic investments were made in three organisations, each representing one 
of the three levers to effect change: Amnesty International Ireland (Amnesty, from 
2006), Mental Health Reform (formerly the Irish Mental Health Coalition, from 
2006), and Headstrong (the foundation established Headstrong in 2006 and 
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supported development of its Jigsaw model). Other investments were made in 
national youth organisations to build youth resilience (for example, BeLonGTo, 
an LGBT youth support organisation), but these were not direct mental health 
advocacy investments. In broad terms, the strategy translated into investments in:
Amnesty, based on its advocacy/campaign/lobbying experience and its capacity  
to build alliances around shared campaigns;
Mental Health Reform (formerly the Irish Mental Health Coalition) in order to build 
collective capacity in the sector and form a common platform, and finally, 
Headstrong (to demonstrate an effective community-based mental health 
solution, i.e. Jigsaw).
OF invested almost €5 million to achieve its advocacy goal, “to build political will on 
mental health,” as illustrated below. 
2004-2008 € 2009-2013 €
Amnesty International Ireland 590,600 2,301,190






Note: * This amount represents 12% of a total investment of €8 million in Headstrong for the period 2009 - 13. An investment of 
€2.25 million in Headstrong, 2004-2008, was not advocacy related.
Table 3. The One Foundation Investments – Mental Health Advocacy Goal
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Amnesty was to catalyse the issue in the Irish context through its lobbying and 
campaign work while supporting the building of alliances in a sector considered 
fragmented. Once the sectoral alliance was in place and its advocacy capacity 
strengthened, Amnesty would revert to its role as human rights watchdog, 
monitoring and safeguarding rights. Meanwhile, Headstrong’s Jigsaw model (of 
co-ordinated, community-based mental health supports for young people) would 
be developed with OF early investments, and eventually funded by government. 
An outline description of each grantee organisation follows with a brief summary of 
the outcomes and impact of activities conducted in pursuit of this advocacy goal
Amnesty International Ireland (www.amnesty.ie) 
Amnesty International Ireland (Amnesty) has a long track record of success in 
advocating for reform.9 OF began supporting Amnesty in 2006 (with a grant 
of €85,000 and a further €50,000 a year later) to build on the success of its 
2003 campaign, and to “raise mental health to the level of a priority campaign” 
with a general election approaching. Amnesty’s next proposal (2008-2011) was 
granted (€.5 million) to: get into the game quickly with a well-proven campaigning 
organisation and catalyse the area of mental health (EI/1). Of the total investment of 
€5 million in mental health advocacy, OF invested €3.2 million in Amnesty making it 
the main driving force working to achieve OF’s mental health goal. 
Amnesty’s dedicated mental health advocacy unit spearheaded a campaign based 
on three objectives, two of which related to legislation, one to systems change:
i)   the Department of Health and Children (DoHC) review the 2001 Mental Health 
Act against international human rights standards, regarding the Convention on  
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); 
ii)  DoHC publish legislation for appropriate community-based services, and 
iii)  improve inter-departmental practices on mental health. We had never had such 
resources for one campaign area before. It was exciting (EI:19).
Within the advocacy unit, designated posts (four, later five) were tailored to ensuring 
a strong knowledge base to inform advocacy activities to achieve these objectives: 
Campaign Coordinator (experienced in campaign strategy development), Legal 
Officer (national and international law), Policy Officer (mental health service 
provision), Advocacy Officer (experienced in training groups and individuals in 
advocacy skills), and Communications Officer (experienced in media and social 
marketing/public awareness campaigns). An “Experts by Experience Advisory 
Group” (EEAG) was constituted to inform the rights-based approach of the work 
and advocacy activities. Where gaps existed, outside specialists were contracted 
to contribute to the effort. For example, Amnesty commissioned an economics 
consultancy, Indecon (2010) to research the affordability of reform (i.e. move 
from institutional to community-based care) including developing a performance 
assessment framework.10
 
Alongside data-generating activities, Amnesty conducted an anti-discrimination 
social marketing campaign aimed at the public, and worked to ensure there was 
a media focus on mental health issues. It was active in building a sectoral alliance 
via its work in co-founding and facilitating the Irish Mental Health Coalition (the 
9 Disclosure – the Evaluator has been a lifelong member of Amnesty International.
10  Indecon Report, 2010. Accountability in the Delivery of A Vison for Change: A Peformance Assessment Framework for 
Mental Health Services. www.amnesty.ie/reports
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precursor of Mental Health Reform) and the Children’s Mental Health Coalition. 
Amnesty’s lobbying concentrated in two complementary directions - on training 
NGOs and individuals to build advocacy capacity, and direct and indirect lobbying 
of politicians and state agencies. The unit’s work largely continued in this direction 
until 2011, when a policy officer transferred from Amnesty to Mental Health Reform 
to contribute to its enhanced lobbying and campaign capacity. In 2011, a Policy 
Officer was recruited specifically on children’s mental health, as this was a core 
focus of Amnesty’s work in 2011-2013. 
Irish Mental Health Coalition/Mental Health Reform  
(www.mentalhealthreform.ie)
OF’s investment in the Irish Mental Health Coalition (IMHC) was to strengthen 
coalition-building within the sector and build an advocacy platform. Founded in 
2006, IMHC was re-constituted in 2011 as Mental Health Reform (MHR). Members 
include NGO’s in the mental health and allied fields, service user groups, social 
workers, clinical psychologists and families of people with mental health issues. 
OF invested €0.3 million in IMHC in 2010 to develop the mental health sectoral 
alliance over three years – founding members were: Amnesty, Bodywhys (eating 
disorders), Grow (depression), Irish Advocacy Network and Schizophrenia Ireland. 
This grant increased to €0.5 million in 2010 to support the newly constituted Mental 
Health Reform over three years to 2013. In total, the amount invested in MHR was 
in the region of €1 million. 
In addition to building a sectoral alliance, IMHC/MHR’s activities were focused 
on advocating for reform of the mental health system and the right to mental 
health services. It published and circulated twin documents “Guiding a Vision for 
Change - Manifesto” in 2011, which set out MHR’s position on how to achieve 
full implementation of AVFC and the “Agenda for Action,” which set out 18 “asks” 
under three key components:  
1) Promotion of the Recovery Ethos,  
2) Modernisation of the Mental Health Services, and  
3) Increased Accountability, Transparency and Governance.  
 
In its re-constituted form as MHR, a “Defend the Spend” campaign in 2011 and a 
“Don’t Drop the Ball on Mental Health” campaign in 2012 both sought to protect 
the mental health budget from being cut in the recession. MHR engaged in public 
information campaigns in traditional and social media, and in public protests, most 
notably, outside Dáil Éireann in June 2012. These activities complemented MHR’s 
lobbying and were conducted in tandem with involvement in an Oireachtas cross-
party group on mental health and in the Children’s Mental Health Coalition.
Headstrong (www.headstrong.ie)
Headstrong, the National Centre for Youth Mental Health was founded in 
2009 by psychologist Tony Bates (with OF support) in response to a number 
of youth mental health issues: suicide was the leading cause of death, one in 
four were “going through difficult times and felt there was no one to talk to,” a 
lack of support for families; access to appropriate services. In addition, there 
was a stigma associated with youth mental health, compounded by myths and 
misunderstandings. Headstrong aimed to: “give every young person in Ireland 
somewhere to turn to and  someone to talk to.” The organisation has worked with 
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communities and statutory services to empower young people to develop skills and 
resilience to cope with mental health challenges, and with government, media and 
communities to change the way Ireland thinks about youth mental health.
With OF’s investments, Headstrong developed three strands of work: service 
development (via Jigsaw, to streamline a range of services and supports); advocacy 
(with government, media, families and schools in addition to supporting young 
people to advocate for themselves), and research (e.g. the first national study 
of youth mental health, “My World Survey,” to inform programmes and Jigsaw 
projects). Therefore, in addition to developing the Jigsaw model of community-
based supports for young people, the organisation has lobbied government, 
commissioned research and hosted conferences on youth mental health.
Based on OF’s strategy, the Jigsaw model was to demonstrate a solution to 
community-based mental health supports in order to advance OF’s advocacy goal 
– to build political will on mental health. In practice, the Jigsaw model joins together 
the pieces of an existing mental health puzzle to provide a community-based 
solution. Jigsaw sites are designated, youth-friendly spaces, located in the centre 
of a town or city. A critical factor in Jigsaw’s development has been Headstrong’s 
work with communities to build agreement and secure the cooperation of a wide 
range of mental health providers, youth and community workers. By 2013, Jigsaw 
sites had been established in seven counties, four initially (Galway, Kerry, Meath 
and Roscommon) with additional sites in other places almost established or at 
an advanced stage of development (Donegal, Offaly, Dublin 15, Tallaght and 
Clondalkin, Limerick and North Fingal). These sites will enable a coordinated 
response locally to young people’s mental health needs, funded by government. 
4.2 Key Achievements - Portfolio
There was substantial evidence of success in relation to the two main indicators of 
success for the advocacy goal:  
a)  an increase in political will on mental health (as measured by the number and 
content of Oireachtas debates and political polling data), and 
b) adoption of a proven soluion as a national programme (funded by the state). 
The following achievements resulted from the combined activities of grantees and 
demonstrate a number of incremental wins towards achievement of the advocacy 
goal: Increase in Oireachtas (parliamentary) questions and debates (from 10 in 
2009 for Feb./April, to 117 written answers and 3 Dáil debates in 2011), and 
evidence of a positive shift in political commitment. Establishment in 2009 and 
operation of a cross-party Oireachtas group,11 dedicated to Mental Health (20+ 
members of the Dáil and Seanad). This was the first cross-party group of its nature 
formed in the Oireachtas. Increase in number of Jigsaw projects supported by 
government. By 2013, Jigsaw sites in seven counties. Increase in the number 
of political ‘champions’ (and inclusion of mental health in general election and 
Presidential election manifestos in 2011) with acceptance of the benefits of closing 
institutions in favour of community-based services. Public declaration of personal 
struggles with mental health by politicians – former Prime Minister of Norway, 
Kjell Magne Bondevick’s Dublin declaration prompted Minister John Moloney to 
acknowledge his own struggles with mental health, a major step for a serving 
11  The cross-party Oireachtas group on mental health was established in 2009 during the 30th Dáil as a forum for 
discussion and to increase political focus on the issue. 
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minister in Irish politics. Growing awareness and political interest in mental health. 
Poll data (MBL) shows changes in politicians’ attitudes: by 2012, three quarters 
of TDs reported the issue had increased in importance, and the budget needed 
to be increased. Discussion of poll findings hosted at cross-party Oireachtas 
group.12 Three of Amnesty’s four objectives for mental health were included in the 
Programme for Government, 2011-2016. Increase in media coverage of mental 
health (tracked by grantees). Work by AI and MHR has had an impact on public 
perception of the issue and shifted debate away from mental illness to mental 
health. Minister of State portfolio includes mental health and Office for Disability and 
Mental Health established within the Department of Health and Children to support 
cross-department policy development and implementation on mental health.  
New Directorate of Mental Health services established in 2013.  
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Raised political and 
public awareness;
Impact
Structural and  
Systems change.
A  Amnesty:  
 
‘Drive’ lobby and campaign in MH; build 
sectoral coalition; push rights-based case; 
include Services users’ advocates; data 
and research; facilitate Oireachtas group; 
drill down on law; public anti-discrimination 
campaign. 
 
B  IMHC/MHR 
 
MWs issues (CMS data, Case Work, DIC, 
Action Groups, Research) & interpretation 
(Policy G & Board) 
C  Headstrong/Jigsaw 
 
Provide ‘workable’model that is a solution  
to community-based supports.
Advocacy Activities X Target Law: Referendum Passes
€€€ & Supports
e.g. Business Plans
A  Amnesty: 
 
B  IMHC/MHR 
C  Headstrong/Jigsaw 
Foundation  Inputs/Supports
Mental Health Advocacy – Activities, Milestones and Impact 2006-2013 
2003 – Amnesty’s Mental Health campaign;  
2006 – A Vision for Change published, IMHC founded  
 – Headstrong established  
 – Amnesty and IMHC funded;  
2008 – Amnesty’s Advocacy Unit,  
2009 – All party Oireacthas Group on mental health  
 – Amnesty spearheads public campaign; 2010: MHR established, Indecon report;  
2011 –  Closure of institutions; Programme for Government commitments;  
Presidential election priority.
2013 – investment of €70 million and appointment of 383 staff, HSE MH Directorate formed.
 
4.3 Blended Case Study in Advocacy Effectiveness
The following discussion provides a brief analysis of the advocacy performance 
and impact of the work conducted by the three organisations in OF’s mental health 
portfolio. While investments were staggered from 2006 onwards, only Amnesty 
had prior experience of mental health advocacy. In addition, the OF advocacy 
goal was only named in 2008 when mental health advocacy was at an early stage 
of development. 
A  Strong high capacity coalitions – “A challenging birth”
When OF became involved in mental health advocacy there was no unified national 
mental health network, although there was a service-users’ group and several 
national organisations represented people with particular mental health issues. 
Not only were there multiple players, each with their own issues, most were more 
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concerned with services than advocacy. Therefore, the challenge was to bring unity 
to a fragmented sector by developing collective capacity to ensure a strong sectoral 
voice common issues, a coalition-building process that proved to be: a challenging 
birth. We almost lost the baby on several occasions (EI:3).
Amnesty was a founder member and coordinator of the Irish Mental Health Coalition 
(IMHC), established in 2006. While some NGOs may have resented a human rights 
organisation facilitating the development of this coalition, the impact of Amnesty’s 
campaign and lobbying (since 2003) could not be denied: it was widely recognised 
that Amnesty had put mental health issues into the public domain and onto the 
political agenda. Mental health was entirely operated by the State. People didn’t 
agitate. Invisibility was a factor in the past. There was social stigma. Their success 
[Amnesty] has been the disappearance of all that (EI:18).
Over time, the original five member organisations in the IMHC became more 
engaged. Building a strong coalition was a developmental process because some 
organisations didn’t get the policy work [or] were naive, resistant and defensive, 
even fearful about taking on government (EI/19), with others unconvinced of the 
need to put time and energy into advocacy. They see government as a source 
of their ongoing services budget (EI:17). In 2010/2011, IMHC was essentially 
disbanded and renamed as part of the board and organisational development 
process (EI:16) that included recruitment of a new Director and strategic planning. 
OF’s grant of almost €1 million enabled transformation of IMHC into an organisation 
whose very name communicated its mission: Mental Health Reform (MHR).
Mental health was entirely operated 
by the State. People didn’t agitate. 
Invisibility was a factor in the past. 
There was social stigma. Their  
success [Amnesty] has been the 
disappearance of all that.
 
Increased collaboration between Amnesty and Mental Health Reform ensured best 
possible outcomes, under the circumstances (EI:19), and did result in building 
the capacity of the mental health coalition. By 2012, MHR was comprised of 
35 member organisations (up from 5 under IMHC). Its reach had extended to 
organisations working with homeless people, immigrant groups etc. MHR had 
also become an active member of a new alliance, the Children’s Mental Health 
Coalition (developed by Amnesty with funding from OF). Government invited MHR 
to participate on several policy committees such as the National Disability Strategy 
Monitoring Group and the National Housing Standards Monitoring Group. By 2012, 
MHR was active in campaigns (e.g. MHR’s ‘Defend the Spend’), its Director was 
engaging in media work and the organisation had an increased media presence to 
promote its reform message. 
Therefore, the sectoral mental health coalition not only had a difficult birth, it 
took time and support to develop, and was really only gathering steam in 2012, 
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a year before the funding commitment ended. Also, MHR’s fundraising has 
been challenging, due in part to the direct advocacy nature of its work, though 
it has secured funding commitments that should see it through to 2016. Some 
commentators blamed the confusion caused by the emergence of the Children’s 
Mental Health Coalition (led by Amnesty, with funding from OF), and questioned if 
it was a duplication of effort.13 However, the main advocacy lesson emerging is that 
facilitation by an outside player (Amnesty), skilled in lobbying and campaign work, 
can aid the development of sectoral capacity and coalitions, because its focus is on 
advocacy and it is not a competitor for resources within a given sector. However, 
there is a point when the coalition’s strength must ensure its own sustainability. 
B  Strong national grassroots coordination. 
The government’s mental health policy document “A Vision for Change” (2006) 
called for a shift to community-based mental health services and supports. 
Grantees involved in advocacy required information to stimulate local action 
and reaction, i.e. action on what was happening in communities and reaction to 
emerging policy. This two-way link was considered necessary to address gaps in 
data and to stimulate mobilisation. National-local links also provided information on 
political risks in advocating for change and allowed advocates to apply pressure 
on public representatives via local constituency offices. The sweeping reforms in 
AVFC would have a major impact on local areas. One policy-maker explained: You 
have to understand …mental health is an industry in remote places. It contributes 
to the local economy and provides jobs. A hospital needs beef and a local butcher 
gets the business. Several people from the same family might be employed in one 
hospital. People have to have a credible alternative [employment] and communities 
need to be involved [in reforms](EI: 18).
Amnesty and Mental Health Reform took different approaches to establishing and 
maintaining national grassroots links. Amnesty’s nationwide social marketing anti-
discrimination campaign was valuable because it took its message to communities. 
Also, its “Experts by Experience Advisory Group” met on a regular basis in Dublin 
and provided valuable information on local processes and developments. For 
example, research documented the reported experiences of unfair treatment by 
people experiencing mental health problems and this data formed the backbone of 
the anti-discrimination campaign. 
MHR focused on developing a national network through consultation, linking with 
member organisations, professionals and the general public. MHR has facilitated 
four public consultations a year in different parts of Ireland; meet with local groups 
and engage lead mental health professionals at an area level etc. These links have 
been maintained and sustained by a strong social media presence. Therefore, MHR 
has created its own nation-wide connections, and has sought to “capture a different 
constituency” using an education and awareness raising approach with a focus on 
the link between professionals, service users/family members and service providers.
While Dublin was the main site of Amnesty’s lobbying and campaign work, and the 
location of national parliament, members and supporters throughout Ireland (from 
college campuses to local groups) were given online support to mobilse locally 
13  The Children’s Mental Health Coalition established by Amnesty and the Children’s Rights Alliance in Dec. 2009, with 38 
NGOs, including Headstrong. See www.childrensmentalhealth.ie
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(Lobbying Network, Monthly Action, Tools, Tips etc.). From 2011, Mental Health 
Reform built on this work through widespread consultative activity holding eighteen 
public meetings 2011-2013, engaging with the mental health community across 
the country from service users and their families to Executive Clinical Directors of 
Mental Health Services.  
The [MHR] CEO understands the system and has the contacts (EI:11). 
Unlike Amnesty and MHR, where work to maintain and sustain national 
grassroots links was only one aspect of advocacy, it was at the core of 
Headstrong’s Jigsaw approach. Each local Jigsaw project involved the 
development, coordination and support of local providers from Headstrong’s 
national base. Headstrong is a very valuable tool. Jigsaw demonstrates 
success and therefore people are convinced. They want it in their towns. 
They [Headstrong] can’t keep up with demand (EI:18). However, Jigsaw was 
not a one-size-fits-all project model. It was negotiated and tailored to suit local 
needs and available supports. In that sense, it demonstrated the value of a 
commitment to facilitating and coordinating local community-based solutions. 
By 2013, there were nine Jigsaw hubs providing synergy between mental 
health providers and youth supports, funded by the State, and used by young 
people in at seven counties with further hubs in development. 
C   Disciplined and focused messages with effective 
communications 
Amnesty’s anti-discrimination social marketing campaign (2010-
2011 repeated in 2012-2013) was an excellent example of effective 
communications that contributed to advocacy effectiveness. Research 
conducted by Dublin City University into the experiences of unfair 
treatment reported by over 300 people with experience of mental health 
problems14 informed the focus of Amnesty’s anti-discrimination social 
marketing campaign. 
I can’t get a job. I’ve tried and tried. 
They’ll say well where have you been? 
And I’ll say I was in a psychiatric 
hospital and you can see it’s all 
downhill afterward and you never 
hear from them again. 
(Amnesty, “Hear my Voice”)
 
Amnesty demonstrated its campaign experience by using the words of mental 
health service users to highlight issues and multiple media sources to ensure 
14 Published in a 2010 report entitled ‘Hear my Voice’ http://www.amnesty.ie/theresearch.
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maximum message penetration via billboards, bus shelters, newspaper and radio 
advertisements. It brought into the open an issue previously hidden and raised 
awareness of prejudice. Advice from a PR company informed the strategies 
used. In addition, the social marketing campaign empowered people with mental 
health problems who witnessed their words displayed in places of prominence. 
Amnesty focused on mental health service users’ experiences to inform the 
messaging activities. It also engaged with media, activists, and other organisations 
to create public demand for change. The campaign created an environment where 
prejudices among the public were challenged and people were made aware of the 
need for reform.
Therefore, the anti-discrimination social marketing campaign resulted in a 
communications’ hit. In the initial burst 2010-2011, posters were carried on 
roadside billboards (50), at bus shelters (140), in print media sources (12). 
Campaign advertisements (354) were carried on national and local radio 
stations. The impact was estimated by external consultants as follows: up to 2.4 
million people had seen the print advertisements, over 600,000 people saw the 
billboards, and approximately 410,000 adults heard the radio advertisement.15 
According to several interviewees, the campaign had a major positive impact 
because it put mental health into the public domain. It stimulated debate in public 
and political circles, framed the discussion around discrimination and rights and 
prioritised the experiences of users as an evidence base to show inadequacies in 
the system. It had massive coverage nationally. It widened the views on mental 
health, even if it had edginess. (EI:18). Once the campaign established advocacy 
traction, politicians were lobbied, inputs made to the Oireachtas Group on Mental 
Health, and polling data used to demonstrate support for reform. 
While Amnesty excelled in bringing the anti-discrimination message to the public, 
it was Mental Health Reform (MHR) that leveraged the public’s political capital. 
The “Defend the Spend” campaign in 2011 gathered 6,000 signatures. This 
was followed by a “Don’t Drop the Ball on Mental Health” campaign in 2012 
that gathered over 10,000 signatories (4,000 online), with canvassing in over 
30 locations. In addition, MHR’s vox pop “Because it’s time” (with the voices of 
service users, and family members from the Grassroots Forum, Gateway Project 
and Basin Club) was widely aired on local and national radio. As a result of these 
activities, MHR was invited to present a Pre-Budget Submission to the Oireachtas 
Health Committee and to the Oireachtas Finance Committee. 
Headstrong, OF’s third grantee in the portfolio, also contributed to the 
communications effort. Through his column in The Irish Times, radio and TV inputs, 
Tony Bates, the CEO, was a highly regarded commentator advocating reform. 
While his message was often focused on youth mental health, he also supported 
reforms common to all portfolio organisations. He [Tony Bates] has been very 
convincing. I notice that he is a regularly cited by ministers and is viewed very 
favourably in the political world and among the general public. (EI:18)
However, a senior government official found Amnesty’s use of rights-based 
language offensive. They were preaching human rights at us. It was extremely 
irritating and a bit precious (EI:11). Therefore, not all advocacy targets responded 
positively to the human rights message. The lesson suggests that advocates need 
15  These data are drawn from Amnesty’s records and an assessment by Wilson Hartnell PR (Ogilvy), 2011.  
Wilson Hartnell worked with Amnesty on a number of advocacy-related reviews and consultations.
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to be flexible enough to re-frame the message in language that suits the audience. 
It also illustrates the value of multiple approaches towards achievement of the 
advocacy goal, in particular, Mental Health Reform’s strategy of consultation, 
education and awareness-raising to build public and political support for reform. 
Media coverage was a priority for all three organisations (tracked across all media) 
to keep alive the message of reform and to communicate evidence of public and 
political commitment to reform (emerging from polls), and workable solutions for 
locally based supports (as demonstrated by Jigsaw). 
The lesson suggests that advocates  
need to be flexible enough to  
re-frame the message in language  
that suits the audience. 
D  Solid research and knowledge base
As a result of work conducted by grantees, there has been some improvement 
in research and knowledge in mental health, which has supported reform and 
contributed to building political will. Prior to OF engagement in the area, data were 
limited and received minimal media coverage. One interviewee explained: The 
Commissioner’s Report was the government’s main data source on mental health. 
It informed decisions about services. Even though it was published annually, there 
wasn’t much fanfare in the media (EI:3). Data were required to substantiate claims 
for change, while providing evidence of workable solutions. The HSE is seen as 
failing and it is failing. We all needed to admit to that and to see some green 
shoots. (EI:18)
Two grantees (Amnesty and Headstrong) addressed the research and knowledge 
gaps by commissioning research or by gathering data. For example, in a creative 
move in an economic recession, Amnesty commissioned an independent 
economics consultancy, Indecon (2010), to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of 
the shift from the institutional model of mental health care to a community-based 
approach. The findings provided evidence of significant cost savings in the longer 
term and were widely reported as such. However, the approach did not find 
favour with certain quarters in government because Amnesty did not involve the 
department in the research process. That really got up the nose of the department 
(EI:19). While Amnesty had submitted an advance copy of the final draft to the 
department for comment, it was clear that relevant officials were displeased at not 
being included earlier in the research design and drafting. This lack of government 
involvement in the research process had the unintended effect of alienating certain 
civil servants. Therefore, the data did not have the traction anticipated. 
The experience offered an advocacy lesson: key stakeholders need to be 
consulted and if at all possible, included in research processes, to maximise the 
likelihood of findings being translated into advocacy wins. There will be times 
when involvement is not appropriate, because of a need to highlight poor practice. 
However, if the research is conducted to advance claims for change, the relevant 
departments should not only be given the opportunity to view findings prior to a 
public launch but where possible/appropriate to be involved at an earlier stage. 
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Indecon’s research provided several nuggets that informed the advocacy strategy, 
including, for example, that top heavy reliance on psychiatric nurses in mental 
health institutions sapped a good proportion of the mental health budget (EI:19). 
Closure of the mental health institutions would have a major impact on jobs and 
a negative impact on the economic life of the towns and communities where they 
were located. Therefore, reform posed a major political risk to politicians in whose 
constituencies these were located.
Headstrong’s “My World” (2012) survey is another example of commissioned 
research that addressed a data and knowledge gap. It was one of a number of data 
gathering activities to inform best practice and quality standards in mental health 
delivery via Jigsaw sites. The survey, conducted by the UCD School of Psychology, 
captured the views of 14,500 young people and provided one of the largest national 
data sets on youth mental health in the world. The main finding was that the most 
important factor in supporting and promoting positive mental health outcomes for 
young people was the consistent presence of one adult in their lives, “someone who 
knows and understands them.” This was a finding the Irish public could actually 
embrace with some degree of hope in the face of mounting levels of despair about 
youth suicide and increased mental health pressures. “My World” survey findings 
have already translated into government policy.16 These examples demonstrate the 
contribution research and knowledge made to advocacy for mental health reform. 
E  Timely, opportunistic lobbying and engagement
Mental health “Champions” across various governments were vital targets in the 
lobbying strategy, none more so than Fianna Fáil’s John Moloney, TD, Minister 
for State (2008-2011), a politician, publican and undertaker, who witnessed first 
hand the rise in suicides in his constituency. His role as Minister for State and his 
relationship with the then Taoiseach (his constituency colleague, Brian Cowen) 
coincided with grantee lobbying and offered a direct line to Cabinet. 
Perhaps the greatest indicator of successful political engagement on the issue 
was the establishment and operation of a cross-party, Oireachtas Group on Mental 
Health, a first in terms of Irish parliamentary processes. The group was facilitated by 
Amnesty initially, then jointly with MHR from 2011 until 2013, when MHR assumed 
responsibility. The Group’s purpose is to facilitate debate at regular intervals on 
structural (institutional to community-based supports) and legislative reform (revised 
Mental Health Act 2001). Senior civil servants were among those called to present, 
to inform the debate. Members were given regular updates that enhanced the 
quality of the debate and external speakers were invited to address the group (e.g. 
Assistant Director of Mental Health, HSE, Martin Rogan, and former Prime Minister 
of Norway, Bondevik). 
Lobbying impact was also evident in growing support for reform: the issue was 
raised in parliamentary questions (PQs), Dáil debates (up from 10 in 2009 to 117 
written answer and 3 debates in 2011), and in political party policy documents. 
The PQs have increased from one year to the next, but there’s a saturation point. 
We’ve probably reached it [2012] (EI:27).
16  Minister for Education, R. Quinn, TD cited its influence on new school guidelines - Wellbeing in post-primary schools: 
Guidelines for mental health promotion and suicide prevention. According to Susan Kenny (NOSP), the research was 
‘part of the rationale of working on the guidelines for schools.’ Irish Times, 31 January 2013.
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A lesson learned was the value of a cross-party approach to widen the political 
base of support for reform beyond individual political champions to all parties. 
It resulted in the inclusion of mental health as an issue in the 2011 General and 
Presidential election manifestos and embedded a commitment to reform in the 2011 
“Programme for Government” (three of Amnesty’s four objectives were included). 
F  Collaborating funders engaged in strategic funding 
The OF strategy was to invest in three organisations, each contributing in its own 
way to achievement of the desired advocacy goal. However, OF’s involvement 
was more than financial grants to support advocacy work. Grantees reported 
additional benefits from collaboration including improvements to management 
and governance, performance monitoring systems, links to wider networks of 
support, etc. 
The most important impact of OF engagement with mental health was to 
stimulate wider interest and engagement with the idea of mental health reform: 
[It] acted as a catalyst to bring serious attention to mental health and push for 
implementation of the government’s stated policy – A Vision for Change (EI:22). 
OF established Headstrong (with Tony Bates), elevated mental health to priority 
status within Amnesty, and helped the Irish Mental Health Coalition transform to 
Mental Health Reform (a sectoral network). It piloted a strategic advocacy effort 
by stimulating sectoral development and provided a solution, a project focused 
on community-based supports. Following regular reviews, the strategy changed, 
in particular when it became clear that building sectoral capacity took more time 
than anticipated. Mental Health Reform were making slow and steady progress by 
2011, but we were worried and decided to continue to invest in Amnesty, beyond 
our original timeframe of investment. That was a really good idea. (EI:3) 
OF collaborated with each of its grantees in the portfolio in different ways. It trusted 
Amnesty’s campaign/lobbying experience to be the public face of this drive to 
catalyse mental health advocacy. Amnesty knew how to keep the issue alive via 
campaigns on gaps in provision and the discrimination experienced by people with 
mental health issues. We had regular reviews and worked with them [foundation 
team] through several versions of our proposals, to tone down expectations. They 
managed the relationship very well from a distance. They had a lot of trust in us. 
We delivered and were accountable. It was very important to have this interest and 
to have a dedicated advocacy unit (EI:19). OF worked closely with MHR until it was 
on a firm footing in terms of management and governance. They helped to broker 
the relationship between Amnesty and Mental Health Reform so that Amnesty was 
gradually exiting and (MHR) was picking up the advocacy work (EI:16).
Collaboration with grantees was not always successful. On-going monitoring and 
performance management resulted in some grantees feeling that the pressure to 
produce results was relentless. The concept of a limited life foundation brings a 
heightened urgency to get results, in this case, in less than a decade. Process 
issues – the time and attention required to build relationships of trust – are central 
to collaboration. Some grantees were of the view that OF did not sufficiently value 
process work: It was all about numbers. How many have you got? (EI:15). The 
experience points to a possible pitfall of a push for advocacy impact in a short 
period. The pressure was never ending. We were all working flat out. It was never 
enough. (EI:15). From this grantee’s perspective, OF did not appreciate the time 
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required to develop working relationships to mainstream innovative programmes. 
This points to the danger of trying to push projects to scale up (multiply in number), 
an indicator of success that does not easily translate to performance measurement 
of outcomes that are highly dependent on social processes. The pressure was 
to deliver more … rather than appreciating the quality of what we were doing. 
That was deeply disappointing (EI:15).
4.3.1 Conclusion
From 2006 to 2013, OF catalysed and supported advocacy capacity in the area 
of mental health in Ireland, an area neglected in terms of social policy, where there 
was previously little political will to champion change, a situation hampered by 
public stigma. The primary indicator of successful achievement – to build political 
will on mental health – was the government’s support for and resourcing of the 
Jigsaw model. While there is still a major gap in translating political will into a 
designated mental health budget, the structural change outlined in the government’s 
policy document has begun: There’s no going back. Like Cortez, we’ve burnt the 
ships and must now exist without them (the institutions) (EI:18). 
In December 2012, politicians and the general public were shocked by the tragic 
death by suicide of the Taoiseach’s close political ally, Minister for State, Shane 
McEntee, TD, that not only brought renewed focus on mental health as an issue, 
but  also highlighted the major stress faced by politicians in key policy-making 
positions, especially in an economic recession.
The impact of advocacy work conducted by OF grantees was evidenced by the 
extent of political engagement, with a documented increase in the number of 
Oireachtas Q&As, the establishment and operation of the cross-party Oireachtas 
Group on Mental Health (ensuring sustainability of the issue in parliamentary 
processes), in politicians’ increased participation in opinion polls and sessions 
to debate the research findings. 
The Fine Gael/Labour government, 2011, included three of Amnesty’s four stated 
objectives in its Programme for Government. It has committed to: 
a)  establishing a cross-departmental group on mental health  
(education, housing, employment); 
b)  a “full and comprehensive review of The Mental Health Act, 2001”  
(in progress a the time of writing) and 
c)  introducing a “Mental Health Capacity Bill” in line with the Convention on the 
Rights of People with Disabilities. This win demonstrates political support in 
principle for reform and rights-based arguments.
The cumulative effect of grantees’ lobbying and campaign activities had been to 
build public interest and encourage political processes to engage with the project 
of mental health reform. While there are ongoing issues regarding government 
resources, the reform argument has largely been won. MHR has received a 
funding commitment to 2016, in recognition of its success in establishing a unified 
sectoral voice for reform. However, the sustainability of mental health advocacy 
beyond 2016 is unclear. Amnesty has now scaled back its mental health focus to 
a monitoring brief and some low level lobbying on the Mental Health Act review. 
Ultimately ensuring mental health rights is a long-term project that will require 
continued advocacy. 
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Summary &  
Conclusions 
During The One Foundation’s (OF) ten-year  
existence, 2004-2013, the advocacy operational 
environment changed dramatically in tandem 
with the economic downturn from boom to bust.
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The evaluation report has documented the outcomes and impact of support of a 
small number of grantees working to advocate for change in the area of children’s 
rights, immigrant rights and mental health reform. This work was supported with 
what one interviewee described as “a very small pot of money” – almost €15 million 
(20%) of its total investment of €75 million, and a short timeframe of ten years. 
In these advocacy goal areas, solid achievements were demonstrated from work 
conducted by grantees in each portfolio that had a positive impact in terms of 
legislation, policy and practice. Case study examples in each of the three advocacy 
areas demonstrated incremental wins in the context of the ultimate OF goals. 
A referendum to change the Irish Constitution to embed the rights of children was 
held and passed in November 2012. From 2006, the Children’s Rights Alliance 
promoted the concept of a referendum. Key advocacy strengths were: CRA’s 
“dream team” (a CEO who was a skilled lobbyist, and a legal/policy analyst who 
produced high-quality, well-researched submissions), its dedicated advocacy 
role on behalf of its (100+) member organisations (a mandate that government 
respected and lent credibility to its proposals for change), and trust (in crafting 
legislation). Its lobbying targets were the UN (to influence the Irish government), 
senior civil servants (to build political will and contribute to solutions, including 
amendment wording), politicians in all parties (to build momentum for change) and 
the general public. While many organisations engaged in the referendum campaign, 
CRA was able to mobilise its membership to add a range of voices for a “Yes” 
vote. While the referendum result is currently subject to a court appeal, there is no 
doubt but that the campaign was a major advocacy win that, in the words of one 
bellwether, would simply not have been possible without One. They have been 
relentless in their pursuit of this (EI:31).
They have been relentless in their  
pursuit of this.
 
Looking to the future, should the referendum result be upheld, a legal framework 
for children’s rights can ensure the State is held to account: the amendment 
recognises the rights of the child, recalibrates the trigger for State intervention in 
the family where the welfare of the child is affected and enshrines a duty to pass 
laws to make adoption available to all children. In certain judicial proceedings, it 
makes the best interests of the child paramount and ensures that the child’s views 
are heard. Policy specialists say the outcome creates future advocacy opportunities 
for children’s rights. Meanwhile, CRA will continue to advocate for the full 
implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights for the Child. In terms of policy 
and practice, legislation is being drafted to establish a Child and Family Agency, 
which will involve 5,000 employees, a budget of over €0.5bn and huge systems 
change. OF also supported two newly established long-term measures: the Child 
Care Law Reporting project (funded with AP) and the Children’s Law Centre.
Major immigration legislation is expected in the second half of 2013 – the 
Immigration Residence and Protection Bill will, at the very least, make transparent 
the State’s policies and processes on immigration. Secondary legislation has 
been enacted to protect the rights of low paid immigrant workers in areas of work 
such as agriculture, domestic care, and restaurant work, and in relation to forced 
labour. MRCI, an OF grantee, has contributed to advancements in immigrant 
rights in a number of these areas. Its advocacy strengths have been in the areas 
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of campaigns, lobbying and supporting low paid migrant workers to build their 
own advocacy. MRCI advocacy was particularly successful in the early years of 
OF support. It built a solid case for reform of labour legislation, brought cases to 
the Labour Court, and demonstrated exploitation of workers in various sectors. 
With the move away from specific migrant worker-related campaign areas to wider 
immigration issues such as irregular migration and access to third level education, 
the organisation lost some advocacy traction. In the context of recession, and a 
reversal in migration trends, politicians had less appetite for immigration reform. 
This is all the more reason why the recent legislative success, Criminal Law (Human 
Trafficking) Bill 2013, achieved as a result of a combined campaign with other 
NGOs, is encouraging. While small gains have been made in political opinion, there 
are also worrying trends, e.g. the percentage of politicians who perceive a rise in 
racist incidents has increased (from 28% in 2011 to 45% in 2012, MBL data). 
There is, however, a slow and growing appreciation among politicians for immigrant 
rights, an important development. Looking to the future, MRCI’s allies in the Trade 
Union movement and equality organisations will become all the more important to 
sustaining its advocacy efforts in light of the challenges identified, as MRCI’s main 
sources of funding (OF and AP) will cease operations by 2016. Several bellwethers 
forecast that the IRB Bill’s provisions will be restrictive because of reduced 
immigration and the economic recession. In addition, major issues continue for 
asylum seekers in Direct Provision Centres. 
Acted as a catalyst to bring serious 
attention to mental health and 
pushed for implementation of the 
government’s stated policy –  
A Vision for Change.
 
The most important impact of OF’s engagement with mental health is that it 
stimulated wider interest and engagement with the issue: [It] acted as a catalyst 
to bring serious attention to mental health and pushed for implementation 
of the government’s stated policy – A Vision for Change (EI:2). OF piloted 
advocacy efforts in mental health by first funding a campaigning specialist 
(Amnesty), stimulating sectoral development (IMHC/MHR), and providing a 
solution (Headstrong’s Jigsaw model). Advocacy conducted by the three grantees 
addressed different points of influence to encourage political processes to engage 
with mental health reform. There are now nine Jigsaw hubs that demonstrate 
successful synergy between mental health providers and youth supports. These 
represent an important best practice resource for future mental health services and 
supports, providing a model of what is possible in community-based mental health 
support. As of 2013, the government has closed all of Ireland’s Victorian asylums 
of containment in favour of community-based mental health supports, focused 
on recovery.
As regards the future, there is still a major issue in relation to the designation of 
the budget required to give effect to the change to community based supports, 
although the political argument has been won. The government’s commitment to 
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review the Mental Health Act, 2001 against human rights standards (in consultation 
with service users, carers and other critical stakeholders) has begun in 2013, as 
has work to introduce a Mental Capacity Bill in line with the Convention on the 
Rights of Person with Disabilities. If enacted, these pieces of legislation will be 
evidence of further advocacy wins. 
The advocacy approach taken by grantees differed in each OF advocacy area due 
in part to the stage of development of the issue within the social change context. 
This illustrates the need for flexibility in determining the appropriate advocacy 
approach. In the area of children’s rights, the case of the Children’s Rights Alliance 
illustrates the value of having a national umbrella body dedicated to advocacy 
with senior management who combine elite lobbying skills with high-quality legal/
policy analysis (informed by the membership and external specialists), working 
with politicians and government outside of the public eye. MRCI’s forte was its 
community work approach that supports migrants to build collective advocacy 
capacity combined with its ability to determine when to lobby, campaign, or 
protest, based on a nuanced read of the operational environment. In the absence 
of a strong, national mental health coalition or advocacy body, an outside player, 
Amnesty, skilled in lobbying and campaign work, brought the issue out of the 
shadows, enabled a mental health advocacy platform to develop (MHR), while 
Headstrong was devising its community-based youth mental health model. 
The experiences documented in the report also demonstrate the value of 
philanthropic support of advocacy in the three areas. The One Foundation’s limited 
life (10 years) approach brought an urgency to seeking solutions to entrenched 
social problems. Its venture or active philanthropy approach meant a high level 
of engagement by the team, a due diligence process, business planning, a 
concentration on management and governance issues, and tailored financing, 
based on performance reviews. At the end of the day you only have to ask the 
question: did they make a difference? The answer is undoubtedly ‘Yes.’ What 
happened to Irish children was truly awful. They’ve [One] made Ireland a better 
place for kids. (EI:20) 
The One Foundation will cease to exist in 2013 and no other home-grown 
philanthropy has emerged to date to replace it. The Atlantic Philanthropies (AP),the 
other major supporter of advocacy will close in 2016. Therefore, there will be less 
support available to NGOs at a time when advocacy continues to be needed in 
each of the policy areas discussed in this report. In social democracies like Ireland, 
philanthropy cannot be a substitute for what government is obliged to provide, but 
it can be a powerful catalyst for social change. As another interviewee put it: The 
problem is not lack of resources, but who has them and what are they doing with 
them (EI:13). 
The Advocacy Initiative – a three-year project funded by AP – is playing an important 
role in terms of facilitating debate about advocacy processes and experiences in 
the Irish social policy context, and in supporting NGOs to build advocacy capacity. 
This is perhaps an appropriate forum for the critical debate on the sustainability of 
advocacy following the exit of The One Foundation (and indeed, AP).
85
One Foundation Advocacy Evaluation -  Summary & Conclusions
The problem is not lack of resources,  
but who has them and what are they 
doing with them.
 
The evaluation highlights the valuable role that philanthropy can play in supporting 
NGOs to advocate to advance social change. From a funder’s point of view, it 
shows that major social impact can be achieved with relatively small amounts 
of funding. However, expectations must be framed in realistic terms. Since the 
funding of advocacy is considered a higher risk than funding services (because 
of unpredictable variables), factors influencing advocacy success from a funder’s 
perspective include identifying suitable NGO(s) to support and backing the right 
leader to build relationships across various constituencies to ensure a critical mass 
of support for the desired change. 
Lessons learned by grantees are discussed in the case studies using the Quinn-
Patton (2008) framework of advocacy effectiveness. More general lessons are as 
follows: 
1. Philanthropic support of advocacy can enhance policy-making processes
The One Foundation’s support of NGO advocacy work was important precisely 
because it was independent of government and therefore enabled advocates to 
persist with arguments on the need to improve policy, structures or practices. 
The OF’s commitment to multi-annual funding resourced grantees to develop 
and implement advocacy strategies that included the systematic gathering or 
commissioning of evidence-based research to further substantiate claims for 
change. In the case of mental health advocacy, its investments supported grantees 
to push government to implement its stated policy, and in the case of children’s 
rights, to address its acknowledged responsibilities. This is particularly important 
in a country like Ireland without a strong tradition of think tanks or resources to 
support advocacy and change. 
2. Supporting advocacy can be risky and time consuming but, if successful,  
can generate significant longer-term impact
Advocacy activities can take a long time to establish the momentum for change. 
Progress can be stalled by unanticipated policy bottlenecks - human, political or 
economic impediments to advancing the claims for change. For example, national 
economic difficulties hampered delivery by government of promised resources from 
the annual health budget in support of mental health reforms. Timing is important 
and campaigns may make little progress until conditions are in place for change to 
occur. However, the successful passage of the children’s referendum demonstrates 
advocacy’s potential for longer-term impact. The education arising from advocacy 
campaigns also underpins longer-term attitudinal change and reforms. 
3. Achieving policy change takes time and funders need to be patient
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The timeframe for the OF support for change in the three areas outlined was a 
ten-year one. Yet in many ways this is a short horizon. It takes time to gear up 
organisations to drive for this kind of change, to build data to support their cases, to 
shape their image, to engage with politicians and the public etc. Also, organisations 
cannot be expected to get everything right and must have time to make some 
mistakes and learn from them. In the case of immigrant rights for example, the 
reversal of migration trends from inward to outward changed the advocacy context 
and challenges considerably in the space of a decade. Advocacy organisations 
like MRCI had to recalibrate strategies to build momentum within a changed 
environment. Therefore, funding organisations must exercise their oversight in a 
patient and subtle manner. 
4. Sectoral coalitions, while ideal for advocacy, are not always possible
While sectoral coalition building is often important to ensure a critical mass of 
support for change, building agreement between multiple players in an advocacy 
area is a complicated process that cannot be rushed or falsely stimulated. For 
example, immigrant organisations required time to establish their sectoral strategy 
because many had emerged in response to the unanticipated rise in numbers of 
migrants entering Ireland. Therefore, in some advocacy areas, the best that can be 
attained in a limited life investment is campaign collaboration, as illustrated by the 
successful passage of legislation on forced labour in 2013. Such cooperation may 
also lead to cross-learning and potentially longer-term cooperation. 
5. A dedicated advocacy organisation representing member organisations in a 
given sector enhances advocacy impact
In only one of the three advocacy goal areas, children’s rights, was there an 
established umbrella organisation, the Children’s Rights Alliance, whose mission 
was to lobby on behalf of members. Its representative status strengthened its 
hand with government, staff forged working relationships with civil servants and 
with politicians across party lines and coordinated a two-way flow of information 
that influenced the solutions proffered for change. While many organisations and 
individuals contributed to the successful holding of a referendum, the influence of 
the CRA can be traced from 2006 to the point of impact in 2012. 
6. Credible data communicated with real-life examples, propels advocacy
Claims for major change not only require robust evidence-based research 
(preferably a combination of in-house and independently commissioned data), 
but also a communication strategy that is flexible and creative. Campaigns that 
foreground the narratives of those directly affected (e.g. mental health service users 
and immigrants) and draw on polling data to demonstrate growing public support 
for change (as evidenced by the MBL polling data) contribute to advocacy traction. 
Social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter) played new and important roles in mobilising 
supporters around campaign efforts in all three advocacy areas. 
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7. Leadership is critical to successful advocacy 
Advocacy is hugely influenced by the capacity of leaders to collaborate with 
colleagues to build agreement on shared advocacy activities. Within children’s 
rights, for example, CRA’s leaders lobbied on behalf of members behind the 
scenes. They did not assume a public profile, nor claim advocacy wins. They also 
forged relationships across political parties and with public servants so that the 
issue gained traction over time in the system. Strategic NGO leaders who build 
strong, working relationships rather than promoting only their own organisation’s 
interests, seem most adept at advancing advocacy goals.
8. Advocacy capacity is enhanced when organisations review performance 
regularly, learn from mistakes, match tactic to opportunity and alter 
approaches accordingly.
No one style or approach can be relied upon to advance the advocacy issue. 
Organisations must have a toolkit of approaches to suit contexts and opportunities. 
The case studies show that NGOs supported by OF undertook a wide range of 
approaches to achieving their goals. Tactics may change following performance 
reviews. For example, when Amnesty realised that its approach to lobbying of 
officials in the Department of Health was perceived as overly aggressive (at a time 
when Amnesty needed access), the organisation softened its approach. Therefore, 
regular reviews can not only improve advocacy but also influence the tone of a 
campaign at a particular time.
9. Supporting rigour of management, analysis and evaluation in NGOs 
ultimately supports the achievement of their goals. 
Some of the organisations funded by OF were small, e.g. employed fewer than 15 
people. In the Irish NGO sector, they may have had a tradition of relatively low, and 
volatile, funding. As such, strategic planning, organising and overseeing sustained 
advocacy campaigns, working at a strategic policy level, and reporting back to OF 
on outcomes, was organisationally challenging. The rigour involved undoubtedly led 
to organisational capacities being built, which should last as a spin-off benefit of the 
decade of focused advocacy work.
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Responds to and Forms 
Preferences and Opinions
What is wanted (by NGOs, 
Citizens, etc.) and why 
Influences moving up policy path 
instruct, limit, permit and shape 
political representatives’ understanding 
of the wishes of ‘the people.’
What is politically 
feasible/possible
Influences moving down policy 
path shape positions at each 
lower level. 
Structures - Bodies Of Influence
Houses Of The Oireachtas Dáil and 
Seanad (Parliamentary Committees Etc.)
Civil Servants (Constant Presence)
Political Parties (Policy Preferences)
Civil Society/ NGOs/Community and
Voluntary Sector
Collective: Advocates & 
Allies – different policy preferences




Evidence to persuade (hard/soft data)
Advocates & Allies – different policy preferences
Access to politicians & media
Capacity to persuade = establish policy preference
Legislative policy-making processes,  
Republic of Ireland 
(O’Carroll, 2010)1
1.  In devising this schema we draw on classic policy texts: the work of Political Scientist Charles E. Lindblom (1984) in the US context,  
and Brian Harvey in the Irish context (1998).
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